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Abstract
We initiate the study of computing (near-)optimal contracts in succinctly representable
principal-agent settings. Here optimality means maximizing the principal’s expected payoff
over all incentive-compatible contracts—known in economics as “second-best” solutions. We
also study a natural relaxation to approximately incentive-compatible contracts.
We focus on principal-agent settings with succinctly described (and exponentially large)
outcome spaces. We show that the computational complexity of computing a near-optimal
contract depends fundamentally on the number of agent actions. For settings with a constant
number of actions, we present a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for the
separation oracle of the dual of the problem of minimizing the principal’s payment to the agent,
and use this subroutine to efficiently compute a δ-incentive-compatible (δ-IC) contract whose
expected payoff matches or surpasses that of the optimal IC contract.
With an arbitrary number of actions, we prove that the problem is hard to approximate
within any constant c. This inapproximability result holds even for δ-IC contracts where δ is a
sufficiently rapidly-decaying function of c. On the positive side, we show that simple linear δ-IC
contracts with constant δ are sufficient to achieve a constant-factor approximation of the “first-
best” (full-welfare-extracting) solution, and that such a contract can be computed in polynomial
time.
1 Introduction
Economic theory distinguishes three fundamentally different problems involving asymmetric infor-
mation and incentives. In the first—known as mechanism design (or screening)—the less informed
party has to make a decision. A canonical example is Myerson’s optimal auction design problem
[42], in which a seller wants to maximize the revenue from selling an item, having only incomplete
information about the buyers’ willingness to pay. The second problem is known as signalling (or
Bayesian persuasion). Here, as in the first case, information is hidden, but this time the more in-
formed party is the active party. A canonical example is Akerlof’s “market for lemons” [1]. In this
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example, sellers are better informed about the quality of the products they sell, and may benefit
by sharing (some) of their information with the buyers.
Both of these basic incentive problems have been studied very successfully and extensively from
a computational perspective, see, e.g., [9, 10, 11, 6, 12, 7, 28, 29] and [19, 21, 17, 20].
The third basic problem, the agency problem in contract theory, has received far less attention
from the theoretical computer science community, despite being regarded as equally important
in economic theory (see, e.g., the scientific background on the 2016 Nobel Prize for Hart and
Holmstro¨m [48]). (A notable exception is [5], which we will discuss with further related work in
more detail below.)
The basic scenario of contract theory is captured by the following hidden-action principal-agent
problem [30]: There is one principal and one agent. The agent can take one of n actions ai ∈ An.
Each action ai is associated with a distribution Fi over m outcomes xj ∈ R≥0, and has a cost
ci ∈ R≥0. The principal designs a contract p that specifies a payment p(xj) for each outcome xj .
The agent chooses an action ai that maximizes expected payment minus cost, i.e.,
∑
j Fi,jp(xj)−ci.
The principal seeks to set up the contract so that the chosen action maximizes expected outcome
minus expected payment, i.e.,
∑
j Fi,jxj −
∑
j Fi,jp(xj).
The principal-agent problem is quite different from mechanism design and signalling, where the
basic difficulty is the information asymmetry and that part of the information is hidden. In the
principal-agent problem the issue is one of moral hazard : in and by itself the agent has no intrinsic
interest in the expected outcome to the principal.
It is straightforward to see that the optimal contract can be found in time polynomial in n and
m by solving n linear programs (LPs). For each action the corresponding LP gives the smallest
expected payment at which this action can be implemented. The action that yields the highest
expected reward minus payment gives the optimal payoff to the principal, and the LP for this action
the optimal contract.
Succinct principal-agent problems. This linear programming-based algorithm for computing
an optimal contract has several analogs in algorithmic game theory:
1. Mechanism design. For many basic mechanism design problems, the optimal (randomized)
mechanism is the solution of a linear program with size polynomial in that of the players’ joint
type space.
2. Signalling. For many computational problems in signalling, the optimal signalling scheme is
the solution to a linear program with size polynomial in the number of receiver actions and
possible states of nature.
3. Correlated equilibria. In finite games, a correlated equilibrium can be computed using a linear
program with size polynomial in the number of game outcomes.
These linear-programming-based solutions are unsatisfactory when their size is exponential in some
parameter of interest. For example, in the mechanism design and correlated equilibria examples,
the size of the LP is exponential in the number of players. A major contribution of theoretical
computer science to game theory and economics has been the articulation of natural classes of
succinctly representable settings and a thorough study of the computational complexity of optimal
design problems in such settings. Examples include work on multi-dimensional mechanism design
that has emphasized succinct type distributions [9, 10, 11, 12], succinct signalling schemes with an
exponential number of states of nature [20], and the efficient computation of correlated equilibria
in succinctly representable multi-player games [46, 36]. The goal of this paper is to initiate an
analogous line of work for succinctly described agency problems in contract theory.
We focus on principal-agent settings with succinctly described (and exponentially large) outcome
spaces, along with a reward function that supports value queries and a distribution for each action
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with polynomial description. While there are many such settings one can study, we focus on what
is arguably the most natural one from a theoretical computer science perspective, where outcomes
correspond to vertices of the hypercube, the reward function is additive, and the distributions
are product distributions. (Cf., work on computing revenue-maximizing multi-item auctions with
product distributions over additive valutions, e.g. [9, 10].)
For example, outcomes could correspond to sets of items, where items are sold separately using
posted prices. Actions could correspond to different marketing strategies (with different costs),
which lead to different (independent) probabilities of sales of various items. Or, imagine that a firm
(principal) uses a headhunter (agent) to hire an employee (action). Dimensions could correspond
to tasks or skills. Actions correspond to types of employees, costs correspond to the difficulty of
recruiting an employee of a given type, and for each employee type there is some likelihood that
they will possess each skill (or be able to complete some task). The firm wants to motivate the
headhunter to put in enough effort to recruit an employee who is likely to have useful skills for the
firm, without actually running extensive interviews to find out the employee’s type.
In our model, as in the classic model, there is a principal and an agent. The agent can take one
of n actions ai ∈ An, and each action has a cost ci ∈ R≥0. Unlike in the original model, we are given
a set of items M , with |M | = m. Outcomes correspond to subsets of items S ∈ 2M . Each item has
a reward rj , and the reward of a set S of items is
∑
j∈S rj . Every action ai comes with probabilities
qi,j for each item j. If action ai is chosen, each item j is included in the outcome independently
with probability qi,j. A contract specifies a payment pS for each outcome S ∈ 2M . The goal is
to compute a contract that maximizes (perhaps approximately) the principal’s payoff in running
time polynomial in n and m (which is logarithmic in the size |2M | of the outcome space). Note
that if we wish to describe the contract by its nonzero payments, the running time requirement
forces us to use only contracts with polynomial description length, that is, zero payments for all
but polynomially-many S ∈ 2M .
A notion of approximate IC for contracts. The classic approach in contract theory is to
require that the agent is incentivized exactly, i.e., he (weakly) prefers the chosen action over every
other action. We refer to such contracts as incentive compatible or just IC contracts. Motivated
in part by our hardness results for IC contracts (see the next section) and inspired by the success
of notions of approximate incentive compatibility in mechanism design (see [8, 51, 12], hereafter
referred to as the CDW framework), we introduce a notion of approximate incentive compatibility
that is suitable for contracts.
Our notion of δ-incentive compatibility (or δ-IC) is that the agent utility of the approximately
incentivized action ai is at least that of any other action ai′ , less δ. (See Section 2 and Appendix A
for details and discussion.) This notion is natural for several reasons. First, it coincides with
the usual notion of ǫ-IC in “normalized” mechanism design settings (with all valuations between 0
and 1), as in [8, 51]. A second reason is behaviorial. There is an increasing body of work in economics
on behavioral biases in contract theory [39], including strong empirical evidence that such biases
play an important role in practice—for example, that agents “gift” effort to the principals employing
them [2]. The notion of δ-IC offers a mathematical formulation of an agent’s bias. Along similar
lines, [15] advocates generally for approximate IC constraints in settings where the designer can
propose their “preferred action” to agents, in which case an agent may be biased against deviating
due to the complexities involved in determining the agent-optimal action or the psychological costs
of deviating. See also [25] for related discussion in the context of contract theory.
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1.1 Our contribution and techniques
We prove several positive and negative algorithmic results for computing near-optimal contracts in
succinctly described principal-agent settings. Our work reveals a fundamental dichotomy between
settings with a constant number of actions and those with an arbitrary number of actions.
Constant number of actions. For a constant number of actions, we prove in Section 3 that
while it is NP -hard to compute an optimal IC contract, there is an FPTAS that computes a δ-IC
contract with expected principal surplus at least that of the optimal IC contract; the running time
is polynomial in m and 1/δ.
Theorem 1.1 (See Theorem 3.1, Corollary 3.1). For every constant n ≥ 1 and δ > 0, there is an
algorithm that computes a δ-IC contract with expected principal surplus at least that of an optimal
IC contract in time polynomial in m and 1/δ.
The starting point of our algorithm is a linear programming formulation of the problem of
incentivizing a given action with the lowest possible expected payment. Our formulation has a
polynomial number of constraints (one per action other than the to-be-incentivized one) but an
exponential number of variables (one per outcome). A natural idea is to then solve the dual linear
program using the ellipsiod method. The dual separation oracle is: given a weighted mixture of n−1
product distributions (over them items) and a reference product distribution q∗, minimize the ratio
of the probability of outcome S in the mixture distribution and that in the reference distribution.
Unfortunately, as we show, this is an NP -hard problem, even when there are only n = 3 actions. On
the other hand, we provide an FPTAS for the separation oracle in the case of a constant number
of actions, based on a delicate multi-dimensional bucketing approach. The standard method of
translating an FPTAS for a separation oracle to an FPTAS for the corresponding linear program
relies on a scale-invariance property that is absent in our problem. We proceed instead via a
strengthened version of our dual linear program, to which our FPTAS separation oracle still applies,
and show how to extract from an approximately optimal dual solution a δ-IC contract with objective
function value at least that of the optimal solution to the original linear program.
Arbitrary number of actions. The restriction to a constant number of actions is essential for the
positive results above (assuming P 6= NP ). Specifically, we prove in Section 4 that computing the
IC contract that maximizes the expected payoff to the principal is NP -hard, even to approximate
to within any constant c. This hardness of approximation result persists even if we relax from exact
IC to δ-IC contracts, provided δ is sufficiently small as a function of c.
Theorem 1.2 (See Theorem 4.1, Corollary 4.1). For every constant c ∈ R, c ≥ 1, it is NP -hard
to find a IC contract that approximates the optimal expected payoff achievable by an IC contract to
within a multiplicative factor of c.
Theorem 1.3 (See Theorem 4.1, Corollary 4.2). For any constant c ∈ R, c ≥ 5 and δ ≤ ( 14c )c, it
is NP -hard to find a δ-IC contract that guarantees > 2cOPT, where OPT is the optimal expected
payoff achievable by an IC contract.
We prove these hardness of approximation results by reduction from MAX-3SAT, using the
fact that it is NP -hard to distinguish between a satisfiable MAX-3SAT instance and one in which
there is no assignment satisfying more than a 7/8 + α fraction of the clauses, where α is some
arbitrarily small constant [33]. Our reduction utilizes the gap between “first best” (full-welfare-
extracting) and “second best” solutions in contract design settings, where satisfiable instances of
MAX-3SAT map to instances where there is no gap between first and second best and instances of
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MAX-3SAT in which no more than 7/8 + α clauses can be satisfied map to instances where there
is a constant-factor multiplicative gap between the first-best and second-best solutions.
On the positive side, we prove that for every constant δ there is a simple (in fact, linear1) contract
that achieves a cδ-approximation, where cδ is a constant that depends on δ. This approximation
guarantee is with respect to the strongest possible benchmark, the first-best solution.2
Theorem 1.4 (See Theorem 5.1). For every constant δ > 0 there exists a constant cδ and a
polynomial-time (in n and m) computable δ-IC contract that obtains a multiplicative cδ-approximation
to the optimal welfare.
Our proof of this result, in Section 5, shows that the optimal social welfare can be upper bounded
by a sum of (constantly many in δ) expected payoffs achievable by δ-IC contracts. The best such
contract thus obtains a constant approximation to the optimal welfare.
Black-box distributions. Product distributions are a rich and natural class of succinctly repre-
sentable distributions to study, but one could also consider other classes. Perhaps the strongest-
imaginable positive result would be an efficient algorithm for computing a near-optimal contract
that works with no assumptions about each action’s probability distribution over outcomes, other
than the ability to sample from them efficiently. (Positive examples of this sort in signalling prob-
lem include [20] and in mechanism design include [31] and its many follow-ups.) Interestingly, the
principal-agent problem poses unique challenges to such “black-box” positive results. The moral
reason for this is explained, for example, in [49]: Rewards play a dual role in contract settings, both
defining the surplus from the joint project to be shared between the principal and agent and provid-
ing a signal to the principal of the agent’s action. For this reason, in optimal contracts, the payment
to the agent in a given outcome is governed both by the outcome’s reward and on its “informa-
tiveness,” and the latter is highly sensitive to the precise probabilities in the outcome distributions
associated with each action. In Section 6 we translate this intuition into an information-theoretic
impossibility result for the black-box model, showing that positive results are possible only under
strong assumptions on the distributions (e.g., that the minimum non-zero probability is bounded
away from 0).
1.2 Related work
The study of computational aspects of contract theory was pioneered by Babaioff, Feldman and
Nisan [5] (see also their subsequent works, notably [24] and [4]). This line of work studies a problem
referred to as combinatorial agency, in which combinations of agents replace the single agent in the
classic principal-agent model. The challenge in the new model stems from the need to incentivize
multiple agents, while the action structure of each agent is kept simple (effort/no effort). The focus
of this line of work is on complex combinations of agents’ efforts influencing the outcomes, and how
these determine the subsets of agents to contract with. The resulting computational problems are
very different from the computational problems in our model.3
A second direction of highly related work is [3]. This work considers a principal-agent model in
which the agent action space is exponentially sized but compactly represented, and argue that in
1A linear contract is defined by a single parameter α ∈ [0, 1], and sets the payment pS for any set S ∈ 2
M to
pS = α ·
∑
j∈S rj . Linear contracts correspond to a simple percentage commission, and are arguably among the most
frequently used contracts in practice. See [16] and [23] for recent work in economics and computer science in support
of linear contracts.
2Note that the principal’s objective function (reward minus payment to the agent) is a mixed-sign objective; such
functions are generally challenging for relative approximation results.
3For example, several of the key computational questions in their problem turn out to be #P -hard, while all of
the problems we consider are in NP .
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such settings indirect (interactive) mechanisms can be better than one-shot mechanisms. Our focus
is more algorithmic, and instead of a compactly represented action space we consider a compactly
represented outcome space.
A third direction of related work considers a bandit-style model for contract design [34]. In
their model each arm corresponds to a contract, and they present a procedure that starts out with
a discretization of the contract space, which is adaptively refined, and which achieves sublinear
regret in the time horizon. Again the result is quite different from our work, where the complexity
comes from the compactly represented outcome space, and our result on the black-box model sheds
a more negative light on the learning approach.
Further related work comes from Kleinberg and Kleinberg [38] who consider the problem of
delegating a task to an agent in a setting where (unlike in our model) monetary compensation is
not an option. Although payments are not available, they show through an elegant reduction to
the prophet-inequality problem that constant competitive solutions are possible.
A final related line of work was initiated by Carroll [16] who—working in the classic model
(where computational complexity is not an issue)—shows a sense in which linear contracts are
max-min optimal (see also the recent work of [50]). Du¨tting et al. [23] show an alternative such
sense, and also provide tight approximation guarantees for linear contracts.
2 Preliminaries
We start by defining succinct principal-agent settings and the contract design problem.
2.1 Succinct principal-agent settings
Let n and m be parameters. A principal-agent setting is composed of the following: n actions An
among which the agent can choose, and their costs 0 = c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn for the agent; outcomes
which the actions can lead to, and their rewards for the principal; and a mapping from actions to
distributions over outcomes. Crucially, the agent’s choice of action is hidden from the principal,
who observes only the action’s realized outcome. Our goal is to study succinct principal-agent
settings with description size polynomial in n and m; the (implicit) outcome space can have size
exponential in m. Throughout, unless stated otherwise, all principal-agent settings we consider are
succinct. We focus on arguably one of the most natural models of succinctly-described settings,
namely those with additive rewards and product distributions.
In more detail, let M = {1, 2, ..,m}, where M is referred to as the item set. Let the outcome
space be {0, 1}M , that is, every outcome is an item subset S ⊆ M . For every item j ∈ M , the
principal gets an additive reward rj if the realized outcome includes j, so the principal’s reward for
outcome S is rS =
∑
j∈S rj . Every action ai ∈ An is associated with probabilities qi,1, ..., qi,m ∈ [0, 1]
for the items. We denote the corresponding product distribution by qi. When the agent takes action
ai, item j is included in the realized outcome independently with probability qi,j. The probability
of outcome S is thus qi,S = (
∏
j∈S qi,j)(
∏
j /∈S(1− qi,j)). By linearity of expectation, the principal’s
expected reward given action ai is Ri =
∑
S qi,SrS =
∑
j qi,jrj. Action ai’s expected welfare is
Ri − ci, and we assume Ri − ci ≥ 0 for every i ∈ [n].
Example 2.1 (Succinct principal-agent setting). A company (principal) hires an agent to sell its
m products. The agent may succeed in selling any subset of the m items, depending on his effort
level, where the ith level leads to sale of item j with probability qi,j. Reward rj from selling item j
is the profit-margin of product j for the company.
6
Representation. A succinct principal-agent setting is described by an n-vector of costs c, an
m-vector of rewards r, and an n ×m-matrix Q where entry (i, j) is equal to probability qi,j (and
we assume for simplicity that the number of bits of precision for all values is poly(n,m)).
Assumptions. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that all principal-agent settings are normalized,
i.e., Ri ≤ 1 for every ai ∈ An (and thus also ci ≤ 1). Normalization amounts to a simple change of
“currency”, i.e., of the units in which rewards and costs are measured. It is a standard assumption
in the context of approximate incentive compatibility—see Section 2.2 (similar assumptions appear
in both the CDW framework and in [15]). We also assume no dominated actions: every two actions
ai, ai′ have distinct expected rewards Ri 6= Ri′ , and Ri′ < Ri implies ci′ < ci. That is, we assume
away any action that simultaneously costs more for the agent and has lower expected reward for
the principal than some (dominating) alternative action.
Contracts and incentives. A contract p is a vector of payments from the principal to the
agent. Payments are non-negative; this is known as limited liability of the agent.4 The contractual
payments are contingent on the outcomes and not actions, as the actions are not directly observable
by the principal. A contract p can potentially specify a payment pS ≥ 0 for every outcome S, but
by linear programming (LP) considerations detailed below, we can focus on contracts for which the
support size of the vector p is polynomial in n. We sometimes denote by pi the expected payment∑
S⊆M qi,SpS to the agent for choosing action ai, and without loss of generality restrict attention
to contracts for which pi ≤ Ri for every ai ∈ An (in particular, pi ≤ 1 by normalization).
Given contract p, the agent’s expected utility from choosing action ai is pi− ci. The principal’s
expected payoff is then Ri− pi. The agent wishes to maximize his expected utility over all actions
and over an outside option with utility normalized to zero (“individual rationality” or IR). Since
by assumption the cost c1 of action a1 is 0, the outside opportunity is always dominated by action
a1 and so we can omit the outside option from consideration. Therefore, the incentive constraints
for the agent to choose action ai are: pi− ci ≥ pi′ − ci′ for every i′ 6= i. If these constraints hold we
say ai is incentive compatible (IC) (and as discussed, in our model IC implies IR). The standard
tie-breaking assumption in the contract design literature is that among several IC actions the
agent tie-breaks in favor of the principal, i.e. chooses the IC action that maximizes the principal’s
expected payoff.5 We say contract p implements or incentivizes action ai if given p the agent
chooses ai (namely ai is IC and survives tie-breaking). If there exists such a contract for action ai
we say ai is implementable, and slightly abusing notation we sometimes refer to the implementing
contract as an IC contract.
Simple contracts. In a linear contract, the payment scheme is a linear function of the rewards,
i.e., pS = αrS for every outcome S. We refer to α ∈ [0, 1] as the linear contract’s parameter, and
it serves as a succinct representation of the contract. Linear contracts have an alternative succinct
representation by an m-vector of item payments pj = αrj for every j ∈ M , which induce additive
payments pS =
∑
j∈S pj. A natural generalization is separable contracts, the payments of which
can also be separated over the m items and represented by an m-vector of non-negative payments
(not necessarily linear). The optimal linear (resp., separable) contract can be found in polynomial
time (see Proposition A.3 in Appendix A.2). We return to linear contracts in Section 5 and to
separable contracts in Appendix F.
4Limited liability plays a similar role in the contract literature as risk-averseness of the agent. Both reflect
the typical situation in which the principal has “deeper pockets” than the agent and is thus the better bearer of
expenses/risks.
5The idea is that one could perturb the payment schedule slightly to make the desired action uniquely optimal
for the agent. For further discussion see [13, p. 8].
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2.2 Contract design and relaxations
The goal of contract design is to maximize the principal’s expected payoff from the action chosen by
the agent subject to IC constraints. A corresponding computational problem is OPT-CONTRACT:
The input is a succinct principal-agent setting, and the output is the principal’s expected payoff
from the optimal IC contract. A related problem is MIN-PAYMENT: The input is a succinct
principal-agent setting and an action ai, and the output is the minimum expected payment p
∗
i
with which ai can be implemented (up to tie-breaking). OPT-CONTRACT reduces to solving n
instances of MIN-PAYMENT to find p∗i for every action ai, and returning the maximum expected
payoff to the principal maxi∈[n]{Ri − p∗i }. Observe that MIN-PAYMENT can be formulated as an
exponentially-sized LP with 2m variables {pS} (one for each set S ⊆M) and n− 1 constraints:
min
∑
S⊆M
qi,SpS (1)
s.t.
∑
S⊆M
qi,SpS − ci ≥
∑
S⊆M
qi′,SpS − ci′ ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n],
pS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆M.
The dual LP has n − 1 nonnegative variables {λi′} (one for every action i′ other than i), and
exponentially-many constraints:
max
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′(ci − ci′) (2)
s.t.
(∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
)− 1 ≤∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
∀S ⊆ E, qi,S > 0,
λi′ ≥ 0 ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n].
Standard duality considerations imply that there always exists a succinct optimal contract with
n− 1 nonzero payments. However, the ellipsoid method cannot be applied to solve the dual LP in
polynomial time. The separation oracle, which is related to the concept of likelihood ratios from
statistical inference, turns out to be NP-hard except for the n = 2 case—see Proposition A.1 in
Appendix A.1.
We return to LP (1) and to its dual LP (2) in Section 3.
Relaxed IC. Contract design like auction design is ultimately an optimization problem subject to
IC constraints. The state-of-the-art in optimal auction design requires a relaxation of IC constraints
to ǫ-IC. In the CDW framework, the ǫ loss factor is additive and applies to normalized auction
settings. The framework enables polytime computation of an ǫ-IC auction with expected revenue
approximating that of the optimal IC auction.6 Appropriate ǫ-IC relaxations are also studied in
multiple additional contexts—see [15] and references within for voting, matching and competitive
equilibrium; and [45] for Nash equilibrium. We wish to achieve similar results in the context
of optimal contracts. For completeness we include the definition of ǫ-IC cast in the language of
contracts:
Definition 2.1 (δ-IC action). Consider a (normalized) contract setting. For δ ≥ 0, an action ai is
δ-IC given a contract p if the agent loses no more than additive δ in expected utility by choosing ai,
i.e.: pi − ci ≥ pi′ − ci′ − δ for every action ai′ 6= ai.
6To be precise, the CDW framework focuses on Bayesian IC (BIC) and ǫ-BIC auctions.
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(Notation-wise, we will sometimes replace δ by ∆ and refer to ∆-IC actions.) As in the IC
case, we often slightly abuse notation and refer to the contract p itself as δ-IC. By this we mean a
contract p with an (implicit) action ai that is δ-IC given p (if there are several such δ-IC actions,
by our tie-breaking assumption the agent chooses the one that maximizes the principal’s expected
payoff). We also say the contract δ-implements or δ-incentivizes action ai. Finally if there exists
such a contract for ai then we say this action is δ-implementable. Interestingly, by LP duality,
any action can be δ-implemented up to tie-breaking even for arbitrarily small δ (Proposition A.2 in
Appendix A). We denote by δ-OPT-CONTRACT and δ-MIN-PAYMENT the above computational
problems with IC replaced by δ-IC (e.g., the input to δ-OPT-CONTRACT is a succinct principal-
agent setting and a parameter δ, and the output is the principal’s expected payoff from the optimal
δ-IC contract).
In Appendix A.3 we study the relation between optimal IC and δ-IC contracts. We show that
for every δ-IC contract there is an IC contract with approximately the same expected payoff to
the principal up to small—and necessary—multiplicative and additive losses. Thus relaxing IC
to δ-IC increases the expected payoff of the principal only to a certain extent. More precisely,
Proposition A.4 shows that any δ-IC contract can be easily transformed into an IC contract that
maintains at least (1 −
√
δ) of the principal’s expected payoff up to an additive loss of (
√
δ − δ).
Similar results are known in the context of auctions (see [32, 22] for welfare maximization and
[18] for revenue maximization).7 Proposition A.5 shows that an additive loss is necessary, as even
for tiny δ there can be a multiplicative constant-factor gap between the expected payoff of an IC
contract and a δ-IC one.
Relaxed IC with exact IR. In our model, IC implies IR due to the existence of a zero-cost action
a1, but this is no longer the case for δ-IC. What if we are willing to relax IC to δ-IC due to the
considerations above, but do not want to give up on IR? Suppose we enforce IR by assuming that
the agent chooses a δ-IC action only if it has expected utility ≥ 0. The following lemma shows that
this has only a small additive effect on the principal’s expected payoff, allowing us from now on to
focus on δ-IC contracts (IR can be later enforced by applying the lemma):
Lemma 2.1. For every δ-IC contract p that achieves expected payoff of Π for the principal, there
exists a δ-IC and IR contract p′ that achieves expected payoff of ≥ Π− δ.
Proof. Fix a principal-agent setting. Let ai be the action δ-incentivized by contract p and assume
ai is not IR. Observe that the agent’s expected utility from ai is ≥ −δ (otherwise ai would not be
δ-IC with respect to a1, which has expected utility ≥ 0 for the agent). First, if Π > δ, then let p′ be
identical to p except for an additional δ payment for every outcome. Contract p′ still δ-incentivizes
action ai, but now the agent’s expected utility from ai is ≥ 0, as required. Otherwise if Π ≤ δ, let
p′ be the contract with all-zero payments. The expected payoff to the principal is zero, which is at
most an additive δ loss compared to Π.
3 Constant number of actions
In this section we begin our exploration of the computational problems OPT-CONTRACT and
MIN-PAYMENT by considering principal-agent settings with a constant number n of actions. For
every constant n ≥ 3 these problems are NP-hard, and this holds even if the IC requirement is
relaxed to δ-IC (See Proposition B.1 and Corollary B.1 in Appendix B). As our main positive
result, we establish the tractability of finding a δ-IC contract that matches the expected payoff of
7We thanks an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to these references.
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the optimal IC contract. In Section 4 we show this result is too strong to hold for non-constant
values of n (under standard complexity assumptions), and in Section 5 we provide an approximation
result for general settings.
To state our results more formally, fix a principal-agent setting and action ai; let OPTi be
the solution to MIN-PAYMENT for ai (or ∞ if ai cannot be implemented up to tie-breaking
without loss to the principal); and let OPT be the solution to OPT-CONTRACT. Observe that
OPT = maxi∈[n]{Ri −OPTi}. Our main results in this section are the following:
Theorem 3.1 (MIN-PAYMENT). There exists an algorithm that receives as input a (succinct)
principal-agent setting with a constant number of actions and m items, an action ai, and a param-
eter δ > 0, and returns in time poly(m, 1δ ) a contract that δ-incentivizes ai with expected payment
≤ OPTi to the agent.
Corollary 3.1 (OPT-CONTRACT). There exists an algorithm that receives as input a (succinct)
principal-agent setting with a constant number of actions and m items, and a parameter δ > 0, and
returns in time poly(m, 1δ ) a δ-IC contract with expected payoff ≥ OPT to the principal.
Proof. Apply the algorithm from Theorem 3.1 once per action ai to get a contract that δ-incentivizes
ai with expected payoff at least Ri −OPTi to the principal. Maximizing over the actions we get a
δ-IC contract with expected payoff ≥ OPT to the principal.
Corollary 3.1 shows how to achieve OPT with a δ-IC contract rather than an IC one, in the same
vein as the CDW results for auctions. A similar result does not hold for general n unless P=NP
(Corollary 4.2). Note that the δ-IC contract can be transformed into an IR one with an additive δ
loss by applying Lemma 2.1, and to a fully IC one with slightly more loss by Proposition A.4, where
δ can be an arbitrarily small inverse polynomial in m.
In the rest of the section we prove Theorem 3.1.
An FPTAS for the separation oracle. We begin by stating the separation oracle problem.
LP (1) formulates MIN-PAYMENT for action ai. Its dual LP (2) has constraints of the form:
(
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′)− 1 ≤
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
. (3)
We can rewrite (3) as 1 − 1/(∑i′ 6=i λi′) ≤ 1qi,S ·∑i′ 6=i(λi′/(∑i′ 6=i λi′)) · qi′,S. Thus the separation
oracle problem for dual LP (2) is in fact the following problem: Let n be a constant and m a
parameter. The input is n−1 nonnegative weights {αi′} that sum to 1; n−1 product distributions
{qi′}; and a product distribution qi; where all product distributions are over m items M . The goal
is to minimize the likelihood ratio
∑
i′ αi′qi′,S
qi,S
over all outcomes S ⊆ M , where the numerator is
the likelihood given S of the weighted combination distribution
∑
i′ αi′qi′ , and the denominator is
the likelihood given S of distribution qi. Note that the weighted combination distribution is not in
general a product distribution itself.
Denote the optimal solution (i.e. the minimum likelihood ratio) by ρ∗. Solving the separation
oracle problem is NP-hard (Proposition A.1),8 but in Appendix C we show an FPTAS (Lemma 3.1).
Lemma 3.2 gives the guarantee from applying this FPTAS as a separation oracle for dual LP (2).
Lemma 3.1 (FPTAS). There is an algorithm for the separation oracle problem that returns an
outcome S with likelihood ratio ≤ (1 + δ)ρ∗ in time polynomial in m, 1δ .
8In fact the problem is strongly NP-hard; but because it involves products of the form qi,S = (
∏
j∈S qi,j)(
∏
j /∈S(1−
qi,j)), the strong NP-hardness does not rule out an FPTAS [47, Theorem 17.12].
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Lemma 3.2. If the separation oracle FPTAS with parameter δ does not find a violated constraint
of dual LP (2), then for every S the inequality in (3) holds approximately up to (1 + δ):
(
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′)− 1 ≤ (1 + δ)
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
.
Proof. Assume there exists S such that (
∑
i′ 6=i λi′) − 1 > (1 + δ)
∑
i′ 6=i λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
. Then dividing by
(
∑
i′ λi′) and using the definition of ρ
∗ as the minimum likelihood ratio we get 1− 1∑
i′ λi′
> (1+δ)ρ∗.
Combining this with the guarantee of Lemma 3.1, the FPTAS returns S′ with likelihood ratio
< 1− 1∑
i′ λi′
, thus identifying a violated constraint. This completes the proof.
Applying the separation oracle FPTAS: The standard method. Given an FPTAS with
parameter δ for the separation oracle of a dual LP, for many problems it is possible to find in
polynomial time an approximately-optimal, feasible solution to the primal—see, e.g., [37, 14, 35,
44, 27, 26]. We first describe a fairly standard approach in the literature to utilizing a separation
oracle FPTAS, which we refer to as the standard method, and explain where we must deviate from
this approach. The proof of Theorem 3.1 then applies an appropriately modified approach.
The standard method works as follows: Let OPTi be the optimal value of the primal (minimiza-
tion) LP. For a benchmark value Γ, add to the (maximization) dual LP a constraint that requires
its objective to be at least Γ, and attempt to solve the dual by running the ellipsoid algorithm with
the separation oracle FPTAS.
Assume first that the ellipsoid algorithm returns a solution with value Γ. Since the separation
oracle applies the FPTAS, it may wrongly conclude that some solution is feasible despite a slight
violation of one or more of the constraints. For example, if we were to apply the FPTAS separation
oracle from Lemma 3.1 to solve dual LP (2), we could possibly get a solution for which there exists
S such that: ∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
< (
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′)− 1 ≤ (1 + δ)
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
where the second inequality is by Lemma 3.2. Clearly, the value Γ of an approximately-feasible
solution may be higher than OPTi. In the standard method, the approx-imately-feasible solution
can be scaled by 11+δ to regain feasibility while maintaining value of
Γ
1+δ . Scaling thus establishes
that Γ1+δ ≤ OPTi. Now assume that for some (larger) value of Γ, the ellipsoid algorithm identifies
that the dual LP is infeasible. In this case we can be certain that OPTi < Γ, and we can also
find in polynomial time a primal feasible solution with value < Γ (more details in the proof of
Theorem 3.1 below).
Using binary search (in our case over the range [ci, Ri] ⊆ [0, 1] since Ri is the maximum the
principal can pay without losing money), the standard method finds the smallest Γ∗ for which the
dual is identified to be infeasible, up to a negligible binary search error ǫ. This gives a primal
feasible solution that achieves value Γ∗ + ǫ, and at the same time establishes that (Γ
∗)−
1+δ ≤ OPTi
by the scaling argument.9 So the standard method has found an approximately-optimal, feasible
solution to the primal.
Applying the separation oracle FPTAS: Our method. The issue with applying the standard
method to solve MIN-PAYMENT is that the scaling argument does not hold. To see this, consider
an approximately-feasible dual solution for which (
∑
i′ 6=i λi′)−1 ≤ (1+ δ)
∑
i′ 6=i λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
for every S,
and notice that scaling the values {λi′} does not achieve feasibility. We therefore turn to an
alternative method to prove Theorem 3.1.
9The notation (Γ∗)− means any number smaller than Γ∗.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. We apply the standard method using the FPTAS with parameter δ (see
Lemma 3.1) as separation oracle to the following strengthened version of dual LP (2),10 where the
extra (1 + δ) multiplicative factor in the constraints makes them harder to satisfy:
max
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′(ci − ci′) (4)
s.t. (1 + δ)
(
(
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′)− 1
) ≤∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
∀S ⊆ E, qi,S > 0
λi′ ≥ 0 ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n].
Let Γ∗ be the infimum value for which dual LP (4) would be identified as infeasible. The ellipsoid
algorithm is thus able to find an approximately-feasible solution to dual LP (4) with objective (Γ∗)−.
The key observation is that this solution is fully feasible with respect to the original dual LP (2).
This is because if the separation oracle FPTAS does not find a violated constraint of dual LP (4),
then for every S it holds that (
∑
i′ 6=i λi′)−1 ≤
∑
i′ 6=i λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
(by the same argument as in the proof
of Lemma 3.2). From the key observation it follows that
(Γ∗)− ≤ OPTi (5)
(despite the fact that the scaling argument does not hold).
Now let Γ∗+ ǫ be the smallest value for which the binary search runs the ellipsoid algorithm for
dual LP (4) and identifies its infeasibility. During its run for Γ∗+ǫ, the ellipsoid algorithm identifies
polynomially-many separating hyperplanes that constrain the objective to < Γ∗ + ǫ. Formulate a
“small” primal LP with variables corresponding exactly to these hyperplanes. By duality, the small
primal LP has a solution with objective < Γ∗ + ǫ, and moreover since the number of variables and
constraints is polynomial we can find such a solution p∗ in polynomial time. Observe that p∗ is also
a feasible solution to the primal LP corresponding to dual (4) (the only difference from the small
LP is more variables):
min (1 + δ)
∑
S⊆E
qi,SpS (6)
s.t. (1 + δ)
( ∑
S⊆E
qi,SpS
)− ci ≥ ∑
S⊆E
qi′,SpS − ci′ ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n]
pS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ E.
We have thus obtained a contract p∗ that is a feasible solution to LP (6) with objective (1 +
δ)
∑
S⊆E qi,SpS < Γ
∗ + ǫ. For action ai, this contract pays the agent an expected transfer of∑
S⊆E qi,SpS <
Γ∗+ǫ
1+δ . We have the following chain of inequalities:
∑
S⊆E qi,SpS ≤ (Γ
∗)−+ǫ
1+δ ≤
OPTi+ǫ
1+δ ≤ OPTi, where the second inequality is by (5), and the last inequality is by taking the
binary search error to be sufficiently small.11 To complete the proof we must show that p∗ is δ-IC.
This holds since the constraints of LP (6) ensure that for every action ai′ 6= ai, using the notation
pi =
∑
S⊆E qi,SpS , we have pi′ − ci′ ≤ (1+ δ)pi − ci ≤ pi− ci + δpi ≤ pi− ci+ δ (the last inequality
uses that pi ≤ Ri ≤ 1 by normalization).
10Strengthened duals appear, e.g., in [44, 26].
11We use here that OPTi ≥ ci and that the number of bits of precision is polynomial.
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4 Hardness of approximation
In this section unlike the previous one, the number of actions is no longer assumed to be constant.
We show a hardness of approximation result for optimal contracts, based on the known hardness of
approximation for MAX-3SAT. In his landmark paper, [33] shows that it is NP-hard to distinguish
between a satisfiable MAX-3SAT instance, and one in which there is no assignment satisfying more
than 7/8 + α of the clauses, where α is an arbitrarily-small constant (Theorems 5.6 and 8.3 in
[33]). We build upon this to prove our main technical contribution stated in Theorem 4.1, which
immediately leads to our main results for this section in Corollaries 4.1-4.2.
Theorem 4.1. Let c ∈ Z, c ≥ 3 be an (arbitrarily large) constant integer. Let ǫ,∆ ∈ R, ǫ > 0,∆ ∈
[0, 120c ] be such that
ǫ−2∆1/c
3 ∈ (0, 120 ] and ( ǫ−2∆
1/c
3 )
c is an (arbitrarily small) constant. Then it is
NP-hard to determine whether a principal-agent setting has an IC contract extracting full expected
welfare, or whether there is no ∆-IC contract extracting > 1c + ǫ of the expected welfare.
We present two direct implications of Theorem 4.1. First, Corollary 4.1 applies to the OPT-
CONTRACT problem, and states hardness of approximation within any constant of the optimal
expected payoff by an IC contract. (A similar result can be shown for MIN-PAYMENT; see
Appendix D.)
Corollary 4.1. For any constant c ∈ R, c ≥ 1, it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal expected
payoff achievable by an IC contract to within a multiplicative factor c.
Corollary 4.1 suggests that in order to achieve positive results, we may want to follow the
approach of the CDW framework and relax IC to ∆-IC. That is, instead of trying to compute in
polynomial time an approximately-optimal IC contract, we should try to compute in polynomial
time a ∆-IC contract with expected payoff that is guaranteed to approximately exceed that of the
optimal IC contract. The next corollary establishes a computational limitation on this approach:
Corollary 4.2 fixes a constant approximation factor c, and derives ∆ for which a c-approximation
by a ∆-IC contract is NP-hard to find. (It is also possible to reverse the roles—fix ∆ and derive a
constant approximation factor for which NP-hardness holds.) We shall complement this limitation
with a positive result in Section 5.
Corollary 4.2. For any constant c ∈ R, c ≥ 5 and ∆ ≤ ( 14c)c, it is NP-hard to find a ∆-IC contract
that guarantees > 2cOPT , where OPT is the optimal expected payoff achievable by an IC contract.
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Proof. The corollary follows from Theorem 4.1 by setting ǫ = 1c .
It also follows from Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.2 that for every c,∆ as specified, it is NP-hard
to approximate the optimal expected payoff achievable by a ∆-IC contract to within a multiplicative
factor c/2. That is, hardness of approximation also holds for δ-OPT-CONTRACT.
In the remainder of the section we prove Theorem 4.1. After a brief overview, Section 4.2 sets
up some tools for the proof, in Section 4.3 we focus on the special case of c = 2, and in Section 4.4
we prove the more general statement for any constant c.
4.1 Proof overview
It will be instructive to consider first a version of Theorem 4.1 for the case of c = 2:
12The relevant hardness notion is more accurately FNP-hardness.
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Theorem 4.2. Let ǫ,∆ ∈ R, ǫ > 0,∆ ∈ [0, 1202 ] be such that ǫ−2∆
1/2
3 ∈ (0, 120 ] and ( ǫ−2∆
1/2
3 )
2 is
an (arbitrarily small) constant. Then it is NP-hard to determine whether a principal-agent setting
has an IC contract extracting full expected welfare, or whether there is no ∆-IC contract extracting
> 12 + ǫ of the expected welfare.
This theorem is already interesting as it shows that even relaxing IC to ∆-IC where ∆ ≫ 0,
approximating the optimal expected payoff within 65% is computationally hard:
Corollary 4.3. For any ∆ ≤ 1202 , it is NP-hard to find a ∆-IC contract that guarantees > 0.65 ·
OPT , where OPT is the optimal expected payoff achievable by an IC contract.
Proof. The corollary follows from Theorem 4.2 by setting ǫ = 320 .
To establish Theorem 4.2 we present a gap-preserving reduction from any MAX-3SAT instance ϕ
to a principal-agent setting that we call the “product setting” (the reduction appears in Algorithm 2
and is analyzed in Proposition 4.4). The product setting encompasses a 2-action principal-agent
“gap setting”, in which any δ-IC contract for sufficiently small δ cannot extract much more than 12
of the expected welfare (Proposition 4.1).
The special case of c = 2 captures most ideas behind the proof of the more general Theorem 4.1,
but the analysis is simplified by the fact that to extract more than roughly 12 of the expected welfare
in the 2-action gap setting, there is a single action that the contract could potentially incentivize.
The more general case involves gap settings with more actions (the reduction appears in Algorithm 3
and is analyzed in Proposition 4.5). To extract more than ≈ 1c of the expected welfare, the contract
could potentially incentivize almost any one of these actions (Proposition 4.2).
Barrier to going beyond constant c. Our techniques for establishing Theorem 4.1 do not
generalize beyond constant values of c (the approximation factor). The reason for this is that we
do not know of (c, ǫ, f)-gap settings (Definition 4.1) where f(c, ǫ) = o(ǫc). As long as f(c, ǫ) is of
order ǫc, the gap in the MAX-3SAT instance we reduce from must be between 7/8 + ǫc and 1, and
this gap problem is known to be NP-hard only for constant c. As [33] notes, significantly stronger
complexity assumptions may lead to hardness for slightly (but not significantly) larger values of c.
4.2 Key ingredients
In this section we formalize the notions of “gap” and “SAT” principal-agent settings as well as the
notion of an “average action”, which will be useful in proving Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. The term
“gap setting” reflects the gap between the first-best solution (i.e., the expected welfare), and the
second-best solution (i.e., the expected payoff to the principal from the optimal contract). It will be
convenient not to normalize gap settings (and thus also the product settings encompassing them).
This makes our negative results only stronger, as we show next.
Unnormalized settings and a stronger δ-IC notion. Before proceeding we must define what
we mean by a δ-IC contract in an unnormalized setting. Moreover we show that if Theorems 4.1
or 4.2 hold for unnormalized settings with the new δ-IC notion, then they also hold for normalized
settings with the standard δ-IC notion.
Recall that in a normalized setting, action ai that is δ-incentivized by the contract must satisfy
δ-IC constraints of the form pi − ci + δ ≥ pi′ − ci′ for every i′ 6= i. In an unnormalized setting,
an additive δ-deviation from optimality is too weak of a requirement; we require instead that ai
satisfy δ-IC constraints of the form
(1 + δ)pi − ci ≥ pi′ − ci′ ∀i′ 6= i. (7)
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Two key observations are: (i) The constraints in (7) imply the standard δ-IC constraints if pi ≤ 1,
as is the case if the setting is normalized; (ii) The constraints in (7) are invariant to scaling of the
setting and contract (i.e., to a change of currency of the rewards, costs and payments). By these
observations, a δ-IC contract according to the new notion in an unnormalized setting becomes a
standard δ-IC contract after normalization of the setting and payments, with the same fraction of
optimal expected welfare extracted as payoff to the principal.
Assume a negative result holds for unnormalized settings, i.e., it is NP-hard to determine
between the two cases stated in Theorem 4.1 (or Theorem 4.2). Assume for contradiction this
does not hold for normalized settings. Then given an unnormalized setting, we can simply scale
the expected rewards and costs to normalize it, and then determine whether or not there is an IC
contract extracting full expected welfare. If such a contract exists, it is also IC and full-welfare-
extracting in the unnormalized setting after scaling back the payments. On the other hand, by the
discussion above, if there is no standard-notion ∆-IC contract extracting a given fraction of the
expected welfare in the normalized setting, there can also be no such contract with the new ∆-IC
notion in any scaling of the setting. We have this reached a contradiction to NP-hardness. We
conclude that proving our negative results for unnormalized settings only strengthens these results.
Gap settings and their construction. We now turn to the definition of gap settings.
Definition 4.1 (Unstructured gap setting). Let f(c, ǫ) ∈ R≥0 be an increasing function where
c ∈ Z>0 and ǫ ∈ R>0. An unstructured (c, ǫ, f)-gap setting is a principal-agent setting such that
for every 0 ≤ δ ≤ f(c, ǫ), the optimal δ-IC contract can extract no more than 1c + ǫ of the expected
welfare as the principal’s expected payoff.
For convenience we focus on (structured) gap settings as follows.
Definition 4.2 (Gap setting). A (c, ǫ, f)-gap setting is a setting as in Definition 4.1 with the
following structure: there is a single item and c actions; the first action has zero cost; the last
action has probability 1 for the item and maximum expected welfare among all actions.
To construct a gap setting, we construct a principal-agent setting with a single item, c actions
and parameter γ ∈ R>0, γ < 1. The construction is similar to [23], but requires a different analysis.
For every i ∈ [c], set the probability of action ai for the item to γc−i, and set ai’s cost to ci =
(1/γi−1)− i+(i−1)γ. Set the reward for the item to be 1/γc−1. Observe that the expected welfare
of action ai is i − (i − 1)γ, so the last action has the maximum expected welfare c − (c − 1)γ.
This establishes the structural requirements from a gap setting (Definition 4.2). Propositions 4.1
and 4.2 establish the gap requirements from a gap setting (Definition 4.1) for c = 2 and c ≥ 3,
respectively—the separation between these cases is for clarity of presentation. We use the former
in Section 4.3, in which we show hardness for the c = 2 case; the latter is a generalization to
arbitrary-large constant c. See Appendix E.1 for proofs.
Proposition 4.1 (2-action gap settings). For every ǫ ∈ (0, 14 ], there exists a (2, ǫ, ǫ2)-gap setting.
Proposition 4.2 (c-action gap settings). For every c ≥ 3 and ǫ ∈ (0, 14 ], there exists a (c, ǫ, ǫc)-gap
setting.
For concreteness we describe the 2-action gap setting: The agent has c = 2 actions, which can
be thought of as “effort” and “no effort”. Effort has cost 1ǫ −2+ǫ, and no effort has cost 0. Without
effort the item has probability ǫ, and with effort the probability is 1. The reward associated with
the item is 1ǫ . It is immediate to see that the maximum expected welfare (first-best) is 2 − ǫ. In
the proof of Proposition 4.1 we show that the best an ǫ2-IC contract can extract is ≈ 1.
15
Average actions and SAT settings. The motivation for the next definition is that given a
contract, for an action to be IC or δ-IC it must yield higher expected utility for the agent in
comparison to the “average action”. Average actions are thus a useful tool for analyzing contracts.
Definition 4.3 (Average action). Given a principal-agent setting and a subset of actions, by the
average action we refer to a hypothetical action with the average of the subset’s distributions, and
average cost. (If a particular subset is not specified, the average is taken over all actions in the
setting.)
Another useful ingredient will be SAT settings defined as follows.
Definition 4.4 (SAT setting). A SAT principal-agent setting corresponds to a MAX-3SAT instance
ϕ. If ϕ has n clauses and m variables then the SAT setting has n actions and m items. Two
conditions hold: (1) ϕ is satisfiable if and only if there is an item set in the SAT setting that the
average action leads to with zero probability; (2) If every assignment to ϕ satisfies at most 7/8 +α
of the clauses, then for every item set S the average action leads to S with probability at least 1−8α2m .
The following proposition (whose proof appears in Appendix E.2) provides a reduction from
MAX-3SAT instances to SAT settings.
Proposition 4.3. For every ϕ the reduction in Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial time on input ϕ
and returns a SAT setting corresponding to ϕ.
Algorithm 1 SAT setting construction in polytime
Input : A MAX-3SAT instance ϕ with n clauses and m variables.
Output: A principal-agent SAT setting (Definition 4.4) corresponding to ϕ.
begin
Given ϕ, construct a principal-agent setting in which every clause corresponds to an action
with a product distribution, and for every variable there is a corresponding item. If variable
j appears in clause i of ϕ as a positive literal, then let item j’s probability in the ith product
distribution be 0, and if it appears as a negative literal then let item j’s probability be 1. Set
all other probabilities to be 12 . We set the costs of all actions and the rewards for all items to
be 0.
end
4.3 The c = 2 case: Proof of Theorem 4.2
In this section we present a polynomial-time reduction from MAX-3SAT to a product setting,
which combines gap and SAT settings. The reduction appears in Algorithm 2. We then analyze
the guarantees of the reduction and use them to prove Theorem 4.2. Most of the analysis appears
in Proposition 4.4, which shows that the reduction in Algorithm 2 is gap-preserving. Some of the
results are formulated in general terms so they can be reused in the next section (Section 4.4).
Before turning to Proposition 4.4, we begin with two simple observations about the product
setting resulting from the reduction.
Observation 4.1. Partition all actions of the product setting but the last one into blocks of n
actions each.13 Every action in the ith block has the same expected reward for the principal as
action ai in the gap setting, and the last action in the product setting has the same expected reward
as the last action in the gap setting.
13If the number of actions in the gap setting is 2, there is a single such block.
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Algorithm 2 Polytime reduction from MAX-3SAT to principal-agent
Input : A MAX-3SAT instance ϕ with n clauses and m variables; a parameter ǫ ∈ R≥0.
Output: A principal-agent product setting combining a SAT setting and a gap setting.
begin
Combine the SAT setting corresponding to ϕ (attainable in polytime by Proposition 4.3) with a
poly-sized (2, ǫ, ǫ2)-gap setting (exists by Proposition 4.1) to get the product setting, as follows:
• The product setting has n + 1 actions and m + 1 items: m “SAT items” correspond to
the SAT setting items, and the last “gap item” corresponds to the gap setting item.
• The upper-left block of the product setting’s (n + 1) × (m+ 1) matrix of probabilities is
the SAT setting’s n ×m matrix of probabilities. The entire lower-left 1 ×m block is set
to 12 . The entire upper-right n× 1 block is set to the probability that action a1 in the gap
setting results in the item. The remaining lower-right 1× 1 block is set to the probability
that the last action in the gap setting results in the item.
• In the product setting, the rewards for the m SAT items are set to 0, and the reward for
the gap item is set as in the gap setting.
• The costs of the first n actions in the product setting are the cost of action a1 in the gap
setting; the cost of the last action in the product setting is the cost of the last action in
the gap setting.
end
Corollary 4.4. The optimal expected welfares of the product and gap settings are the same, and
are determined by their respective last actions.
Proposition 4.4 (Gap preservation by Algorithm 2). Let ϕ be a MAX-3SAT instance for which
either there is a satisfying assignment, or every assignment satisfies at most 7/8+α of the clauses
for α ≤ (0.05)2. Let ∆ ≤ (0.05)2. Consider the product setting resulting from the reduction in
Algorithm 2 run on input ϕ, ǫ = 3α1/2 + 2∆1/2 ≤ 14 . Then:
1. If ϕ has a satisfying assignment, the product setting has an IC contract that extracts full expected
welfare;
2. If every assignment to ϕ satisfies at most 7/8+α of the clauses, the optimal ∆-IC contract can
extract no more than 12 + ǫ of the expected welfare.
Proof. First, if ϕ has a satisfying assignment, then there is a subset of SAT items that has zero
probability according to every one of the first n actions. Consider the outcome S∗ combining this
subset together with the gap item. We construct a full-welfare extracting contract: the contract’s
payment for S∗ is the cost of the last action in the product setting multiplied by 2m (since the
probability of S∗ according to the last action is 1/2m), and all other payments are set to zero. It
is not hard to see that the resulting contract makes the agent indifferent among all actions, so by
tie-breaking in favor of the principal, the principal receives the full expected welfare as her payoff.
Now consider the case that every assignment to ϕ satisfies at most 7/8 + α of the clauses, and
assume for contradiction that there is a ∆-IC contract p for the product setting that extracts more
than 12 + ǫ of the expected welfare. We derive from p a δ-IC contract p
′ for the (2, ǫ, ǫ2)-gap setting
where δ ≤ ǫ2, which extracts more than 12 + ǫ of the expected welfare. This is a contradiction to
the properties of the gap setting (Definition 4.1).
It remains to specify and analyze contract p′ : For brevity we denote the singleton containing
the gap item by M ′, and define
p′(S′) = 1−8α2m
∑
S⊆[m] p(S ∪ S′) ∀S′ ⊆M ′, (8)
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where S′ is either the singleton containing the gap item or the empty set. The starting point of the
analysis is the observation that to extract > 12 + ǫ of the expected welfare in the product setting,
contract p must ∆-incentivize the last action (this follows since the expected rewards and costs of
the actions are as in the gap setting by Observation 4.1, and so the same argument as in the proof
of Proposition 4.1 holds).
Claim 4.1 below establishes that if contract p ∆-incentivizes the last action in the product
setting, then contract p′ δ-incentivizes the last action in the gap setting for δ = 8α+∆1−8α . So indeed
δ =
8α
1− 8α +
∆
1− 8α
≤ 9α + 4∆
= (3α1/2)2 + (2∆1/2)2
≤ (3α1/2 + 2∆1/2)2 = ǫ2,
using that α,∆ ≤ (0.05)2 for the first inequality.
Now observe that the expected payoff to the principal from contract p′ δ-incen-tivizing the last
gap setting action is at least that of contract p ∆-incentivizing the last product setting action: the
payments of p′ as defined in (8) are the average payments of p lowered by a factor of (1− 8ǫ), and
the expected rewards in the two settings are the same (Observation 4.1). The expected welfares
in the two settings are also equal (Corollary 4.4). We conclude that like contract p in the product
setting, contract p′ guarantees extraction of > 12 + ǫ of the expected welfare in the gap setting.
This leads to a contradiction and completes the proof of Proposition 4.4 (up to Claim 4.1 proved
below).
The next claim is formulated in general terms so that it can also be used in Section 4.4. It
references the contract p′ defined in (8).
Claim 4.1. Assume every assignment to the MAX-3SAT instance ϕ satisfies at most 7/8 + α of
its clauses where α < 18 , and consider the product and gap settings returned by the reduction in
Algorithm 2 (resp., Algorithm 3). If in the product setting the last action is ∆-incentivized by
contract p, then in the gap setting the last action is δ-incentivized by contract p′ for δ = 8α+∆1−8α .
Proof. Let gi denote the distribution of action ai in the gap setting and let c be the number of
actions in this setting. In the product setting, by construction its last action assigns probability
gc(S′)
2m to every set S∪S′ such that S contains SAT items and S′ ⊆M ′. Thus the expected payment
for the last action given contract p is
∑
S⊆[m]
∑
S′⊆M ′
gc(S
′)
2m
p(S ∪ S′) = 1
1− 8α
∑
S′⊆M ′
gc(S
′)p′(S′), (9)
where the equality follows from the definition of p′ in (8). Note that the resulting expression in (9)
is precisely the expected payment for the last action in the gap setting given contract p′, multiplied
by factor 1/(1 − 8α).
Similarly, for every i ∈ c consider the average action over the ith block of n actions in the
product setting.14 Again by construction, the probability this ith average action assigns to S ∪ S′
is ≥ gi(S′)(1−8α)2m , where we use that the average action of the SAT setting has probability ≥ 1−8α2m
14If c = 2 there is a single such block.
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for S (Definition 4.4). Thus the expected payment for the ith average action given contract p is at
least
∑
S⊆[m]
∑
S′⊆M ′
gi(S
′)(1− 8α)
2m
p(S ∪ S′) =
∑
S′⊆M ′
gi(S
′)p′(S′) ∀i ∈ [c], (10)
where again the equality follows from (8). Note that the resulting expression in (10) is precisely
the expected payment for action ai in the gap setting given contract p
′.
We now use the assumption that in the product setting, contract p ∆-incentivizes the last
action. This means the agent ∆-prefers the last action to the ith average action, which has cost
zero. Combining (9) and (10) we get
1 + ∆
1− 8α
∑
S′⊆M ′
gc(S
′)p′(S′)− C ≥
∑
S′⊆M ′
gi(S
′)p′(S′) ∀i ∈ [c], (11)
where C denotes the cost of the last action in the product and gap settings. By definition of δ-IC,
Inequality (11) immediately implies that in the gap setting, the last action is δ-IC given contract
p′ where δ = 8α+∆1−8α , thus completing the proof of Claim 4.1.
We can now use Proposition 4.4 to prove Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Recall that (ǫ−2∆
1/2)2
9 is a constant ≤ (0.05)2. Assume a polynomial-time
algorithm for determining whether a principal-agent setting has a (fully-IC) contract that extracts
the full expected welfare, or whether no ∆-IC contract can extract more than 12 + ǫ. Then given
a MAX-3SAT instance ϕ for which either there is a satisfying assignment or every assignment
satisfies at most 78 +
(ǫ−2∆1/2)2
9 of the clauses, by Proposition 4.4 the product setting (constructed
in polynomial time) either has a full-welfare extracting contract or has no ∆-IC contract that can
extract more than 12 + ǫ. Since the algorithm can determine among these two cases, it can solve the
MAX-3SAT instance ϕ. But by [33] and since (ǫ−2∆
1/2)2
9 is a constant, we know that there is no
polynomial-time algorithm for solving such MAX-3SAT instances unless P = NP . This completes
the proof of Theorem 4.2.
4.4 The general case: Proof of Theorem 4.1
In this section we formulate and analyze the guarantees of the reduction in Algorithm 3.
Proposition 4.5 (Gap preservation by Algorithm 3). Let c ∈ Z, c ≥ 3. Let ϕ be a MAX-3SAT
instance for which either there is a satisfying assignment, or every assignment satisfies at most
7/8+α of the clauses for α ≤ (0.05)c. Let ∆ ≤ (0.05)c. Consider the product setting resulting from
the reduction in Algorithm 3 run on input ϕ, c, ǫ = 3α1/c + 2∆1/c ≤ 14 . Then:
1. If ϕ has a satisfying assignment, the product setting has an IC contract that extracts full expected
welfare;
2. If every assignment to ϕ satisfies at most 7/8+α of the clauses, the optimal ∆-IC contract can
extract no more than 1c + ǫ of the expected welfare.
Proof. First, if ϕ has a satisfying assignment, then there is a subset of SAT items that has zero
probability according to every one of the actions in the product setting except for the last action,
and so we can construct a full-welfare extracting contract as in the proof of Proposition 4.4. From
now on consider the case that every assignment to ϕ satisfies at most 7/8 + α of the clauses, and
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Algorithm 3 Generalized polytime reduction from MAX-3SAT to principal-agent
Input : AMAX-3SAT instance ϕ with n clauses andm variables; parameters ǫ ∈ R≥0 and c ∈ Z>0
where c ≥ 3.
Output: A principal-agent product setting combining copies of a SAT setting and a gap setting.
begin
Combine multiple copies of the SAT setting corresponding to ϕ (attain-
able in polytime by Proposition 4.3) with a poly-sized (c, ǫ, ǫc)-gap set-
ting (exists by Proposition 4.2) to get the product setting, as follows:
• The product setting has cn + 1 actions and m + 1 items: m “SAT items” correspond to
the SAT setting items, and the last “gap item” corresponds to the gap setting item.
• For every i ∈ [c], consider the ith block of n rows of the product setting’s (cn+1)×(m+1)
matrix of probabilities. The ith block consists of row (i− 1) · n+ 1 to row i · n and forms
a submatrix of size n× (m+ 1). The first m columns of the sub-matrix are set to a copy
of the SAT setting’s n × m matrix of probabilities, and the entire last column is set to
the probability that action ai in the gap setting results in the item. Finally, the first m
entries of the last row of the product setting’s matrix (i.e., row cn + 1) are set to 12 , and
the last entry (the lower-right corner of the matrix) is set to the probability that the last
action in the gap setting results in the item.
• In the product setting, the rewards for the m SAT items are set to 0, and the reward for
the gap item is set as in the gap setting.
• For every i ∈ [c], the costs of the n actions in block i are the cost of action ai in the gap
setting; the cost of the last action in the product setting is the cost of the last action in
the gap setting.
end
assume for contradiction there is a ∆-IC contract p for the product setting that extracts more than
1
c + ǫ of the expected welfare.
Consider the case that p ∆-incentivizes the last action in the product setting. Then we can
derive from it a δ-IC contract p′ for the (c, ǫ, ǫc)-gap setting where δ ≤ ǫc, which extracts more than
1
c +ǫ of the expected welfare. This is a contradiction to the properties of the gap setting (Definition
4.1). The construction of p′ and its analysis are as in the proof of Proposition 4.4 (where Equation
(8) defines p′), and so are omitted here except for the following verification: we must verify that
indeed δ ≤ ǫc. We know from Claim 4.1 that δ = 8α+∆1−8α . As in the proof of Proposition 4.4 this is
≤ 9α+ 4∆, and it is not hard to see that
9α+ 4∆ ≤ (3α1/c)c + (2∆1/c)c ≤ (3α1/c + 2∆1/c)c = ǫc,
where the first inequality uses that c ≥ 3.
In the remaining case, p ∆-incentivizes an action ai∗k in the product setting which is the kth
action in block i∗ ∈ [c] (recall each block has n actions). We derive from p a contract p′k (depending
on k) for the gap setting that ∆-incentivizes ai∗ at the same expected payment. As in the proof
of Proposition 4.5, this means that p′k extracts >
1
c + ǫ of the expected welfare in the gap setting.
Since ∆ ≤ δ = 8α+∆1−8α it follows from the argument above that ∆ ≤ ǫc, and so we have reached a
contradiction to the properties of the gap setting (Definition 4.1).
We define p′k as follows: Let sk denote the distribution of action ak in the SAT setting. For
every subset S′ ⊆M ′ of gap items,
p′k(S
′) =
∑
S⊆[m]
p(S ∪ S′)sk(S) ∀S′ ⊆M ′, (12)
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where S′ is either the singleton containing the gap item or the empty set.
For the analysis, let gi denote the distribution of action ai in the gap setting. In the product
setting, for every i ∈ [c], k ≤ n the expected payment for action aik by contract p is∑
S∈[m]
∑
S′⊆M ′
sk(S)gi(S
′)p(S ∪ S′). (13)
In the gap setting, the expected payment for ai by contract p
′
k is
∑
S′⊆M ′ gi(S
′)p′(S′), and by
definition of p′k in (12) this coincides with the expected payment in (13). We know that contract p
∆-incentivizes ai∗k in the product setting, in particular against any action aik where i ∈ [c] \ {i∗}
(i.e., against actions in the same position k but in different blocks). This implies that contract p′k
∆-incentivizes ai∗ in the gap setting against any action ai, completing the proof.
We can now use Proposition 4.5 to prove Theorem 4.1. The proof is identical to that of
Theorem 4.2 and so is omitted here.
5 Approximation guarantees
In this section we show that for any constant δ there is a simple, namely linear, δ-IC contract
that extracts as expected payoff for the principal a cδ-fraction of the optimal welfare, where cδ is a
constant that depends only on δ. Recall that a linear contract is defined by a parameter α ∈ [0, 1],
and pays the agent pS = α
∑
j∈S rj for every outcome S ⊆M .
Theorem 5.1. Consider a principal-agent setting with n actions. For every γ ∈ (0, 1) and every
δ > 0 there is a δ-IC linear contract with expected payoff ALG where
ALG ≥
(
(1− γ) 1⌈log1+δ( 1γ )⌉+ 1
)
max
i∈[n]
{Ri − ci}.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 5.1 is that we can compute a δ-IC linear contract that
achieves the claimed constant-factor approximation in polynomial time. By Corollary 4.1 we cannot
achieve a similar result for IC (rather than δ-IC) contracts unless P = NP . In fact, an even stronger
lower bound holds for the class of exactly IC linear (or, more generally, separable) contracts. These
contracts cannot achieve an approximation ratio better than n (see [23] and Appendix F for details).
Geometric understanding of linear contracts. To prove Theorem 5.1 we will rely on the
following geometric understanding of linear contracts developed in [23]. Fix a principal-agent
setting. For a linear contract with parameter α ∈ [0, 1] and an action ai, the expected reward
Ri =
∑
S qi,SrS is split between the principal and the agent, leaving the principal with (1 − α)Ri
in expected utility and the agent with αRi − ci (the sum of the players’ expected utilities is action
ai’s expected welfare). The agent’s expected utility for choosing action ai as a function of α is thus
a line from −ci (for α = 0) to Ri− ci (for α = 1). Drawing these lines for each of the n actions, we
trace the agent’s utility for his best action as α goes from 0 to 1. This gives us the upper envelope
diagram for linear contracts in the given principal-agent setting.
We now analyze some properties of the actions along the upper envelope diagram (i.e., as the
linear contract gives an increasingly higher fraction of the rewards to the agent). Let IN be the
subset of N ≤ n actions implementable by some linear contract. We subdivide the interval [0, 1]
into N ≤ n intervals T1 = [ℓ1, r1), T2 = [ℓ2, r2), . . . , TN = [ℓN , rN ], with ℓ1 = 0, ℓi = ri−1 for
2 ≤ i ≤ N , and rN = 1. The subdivision is such that there is a bijection τ between the indices of
actions ai ∈ IN and between those of intervals Tτ(i), with the following properties:
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1. For every i ∈ [N ] and α in the ith interval Ti, the linear contract with parameter α incentivizes
action aτ−1(i). It follows that every action ai ∈ IN appears on the upper envelope once, and
the smallest α that incentivizes it is the left endpoint ℓτ(i) of this action’s interval.
2. For every i ∈ [N ] it holds that cτ−1(i) ≤ cτ−1(i+1), Rτ−1(i) ≤ Rτ−1(i+1), and Rτ−1(i) − cτ−1(i) ≤
Rτ−1(i+1) − cτ−1(i+1).
Notation. Our proof of Theorem 5.1 uses the following notation:
• We renumber the actions as they appear on the upper envelope from left to right. By the
second property above, we get actions sorted by increasing cost, increasing expected reward
and increasing expected welfare. In particular, the final action (action aN after renaming) must
be the action in An with the highest expected welfare.
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• For every linearly-implementable action ai ∈ IN , we denote by αi the smallest parameter α of
a linear contract that incentivizes ai (i.e., the left endpoint of ai’s corresponding interval).
Approximation guarantee proof. With these definitions at hand, we are now ready to prove
the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Given γ ∈ (0, 1) and δ > 0, set κ = ⌈log1+δ( 1γ )⌉. Subdivide the range [0, 1]
of α-parameters into κ+ 1 intervals:
[0, γ(1 + δ)0), [γ(1 + δ)0, γ(1 + δ)1),
[γ(1 + δ)1, γ(1 + δ)2), . . . , [γ(1 + δ)κ−1, 1].
For each interval k ∈ [κ+1], denote by ah(k) the action ai with the highest expected reward for
which αi falls into this interval (for simplicity of presentation we assume without loss of generality
that such an action exists for each interval).
Note that h(k) < h(k + 1) due to renaming and because actions appear on the upper envelope
in non-decreasing order of expected reward. We require the following definition: For k ≥ 2, define
αh(k−1),h(k) =
ch(k) − ch(k−1)
Rh(k) −Rh(k−1)
,
i.e., αh(k−1),h(k) is the α that makes the agent indifferent between actions h(k − 1) and h(k). For
k = 1 define αh(k−1),h(k) = 0.
The proof now proceeds by two claims. The first claim derives an upper bound on maxi∈[n](Ri−
ci) = RN − cN .
Claim 5.1. maxi∈[n](Ri − ci) = RN − cN ≤
∑κ+1
k=1(1− αh(k−1),h(k))Rh(k).
To prove Claim 5.1 we rely on the following observation from [23].
Observation 5.1. Consider two actions ai, ai′ such that ai has higher expected reward and weakly
higher welfare than ai′ , i.e., Ri > Ri′ and Ri − ci ≥ Ri′ − ci′ , and let αi′,i = (ci − ci′)/(Ri − Ri′).
Then
(Ri − ci)− (Ri′ − ci′) ≤ (1− αi′,i)Ri.
15This is easy to see for α = 1, for which the full reward is transferred to the agent who also bears the cost, and
so picks the welfare-maximizing action.
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Proof of Claim 5.1. We argue by induction that for all k ≥ 1, Rh(k)−ch(k) ≤
∑k
i=1(1−αh(i−1),h(i))Rh(i).
For k = 1, recall that αh(0),h(1) = 0 by definition, and it trivially holds that Rh(1) − ch(1) ≤ Rh(1).
Now assume that the inequality holds for k − 1, i.e.,
Rh(k−1) − ch(k−1) ≤
k−1∑
i=1
(1− αh(i−1),h(i))Rh(i). (14)
By construction we have Rh(k) − ch(k) ≥ Rh(k−1) − ch(k−1) and Rh(k) > Rh(k−1), so we can apply
Observation 5.1 to actions ah(k) and ah(k−1). This shows (Rh(k) − ch(k)) − (Rh(k−1) − ch(k−1)) ≤
(1− αh(k−1),h(k))Rh(k). Adding this to inequality (14) we obtain
Rh(k) − ch(k) ≤
k∑
i=1
(1− αh(i−1),h(i))Rh(i),
as claimed. △
The second crucial observation is that while αh(k−1),h(k) is generally smaller than αh(k) and thus
does not incentivize action h(k), it still δ-incentivizes it.
Claim 5.2. For k = 2, . . . , κ + 1, the linear contract with α = αh(k−1),h(k) ensures that αRh(k) −
ch(k) + δ ≥ αRi − ci for every i ∈ [n].
Proof of Claim 5.2. The lines Rh(k) − ch(k) and Rh(k−1) − ch(k−1) intersect at αh(k−1),h(k). By
construction, their intersection must fall between, on the one hand, the left endpoint γ(1+ δ)k−2 of
the interval in which αh(k) falls, and αh(k) on the other hand. This shows that (1+ δ)αh(k−1),h(k) ≥
(1 + δ)γ(1 + δ)k−2 = γ(1 − δ)k−1 ≥ αh(k). Combining this with the fact that ah(k) is incentivized
exactly at αh(k), we obtain that αh(k−1),h(k)Rh(k) − ch(k) + δ ≥ (1 + δ)αh(k−1),h(k)Rh(k) − ch(k) ≥
αh(k)Rh(k) − ch(k) ≥ αh(k)Ri − ci for all i ∈ [n], where the first inequality holds since Rh(k) ≤ 1 by
normalization. This completes the proof of Claim 5.2. △
Using Claims 5.1 and 5.2, the theorem follows from the fact that to obtain a δ-IC linear contract
we can either incentivize ah(1) at α = αh(1) or δ-incentivize one of the actions ah(2), . . . , ah(κ+1) at
α = αh(k−1),h(k) with 2 ≤ k ≤ κ+ 1. Namely,
ALG ≥ max{(1− αh(1))Rh(1), (1− αh(1),h(2))Rh(2), . . . , (1− αh(κ),h(κ+1))Rh(κ+1)}
≥ (1− γ)max{(1− αh(0),h(1))Rh(1), (1− αh(1),h(2))Rh(2),
. . . , (1− αh(κ),h(κ+1))Rh(κ+1)}
≥ (1− γ) 1
κ+ 1
κ+1∑
i=1
(1 − αh(k−1),h(k))Rh(k)
≥ (1− γ) 1
κ+ 1
OPT,
where for the first inequality applied to ALG we use Claim 5.2, for the second inequality we use
αh(1) ≤ γ and αh(0),h(1) ≥ 0, for the third inequality we lower bound the maximum by the average,
and for the final inequality we use Claim 5.1.
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6 Black-box model
We conclude by considering a black-box model which concerns non-necessarily succinct principal-
agent settings. In this model, the principal knows the set of actions An, the cost ci of each action
ai ∈ An, the set of items M and the rewards rj for each item j ∈ M , but does not know the
probabilities qi,S that action ai assigns to outcome S ⊆M . Instead, the principal has query access
to the distributions {qi}. Upon querying distribution qi of action ai, a (random) set is returned
where S is selected with probability qi,S. Our goal is to study how well a δ-IC contract in this model
can approximate the optimal IC contract if limited to a polynomial number of queries (where the
guarantees should hold with high probability over the random samples). Black-box models have
been studied in other algorithmic game theory contexts such as signaling—see [20] for a successful
example.
Let η = min{qi,S | i ∈ [n], S ⊆ M, qi,S 6= 0} be the minimum non-zero probability of any set
of items under any of the actions. Note that then either qi,S = 0 or qi,S ≥ η for every S. In
Section 6.1 we address the case in which η is inverse super-polynomial and obtain a negative result;
in Section 6.2 we show a positive result for the case of inverse polynomial η.
6.1 Inverse super-polynomial probabilities
We show a negative result for the case where the minimum probability η is inverse super-polynomial,
by showing that poly(1/
√
η) samples are required to obtain a constant factor multiplicative ap-
proximation better than ≈ 1.15. The negative result holds even for succinct settings, in which the
unknown distributions are product distributions.
Theorem 6.1. Assume η ≤ η0 = 1/625 and δ ≤ δ0 = 1/100. Even with n = 2 actions and m = 2
items, achieving a multiplicative ≤ 1.15 approximation to the optimal IC contract through a δ-IC
contract, where the approximation guarantee is required to hold with probability at least 1− γ, may
require at least s ≥ − log(γ)/(9√η) queries.
Proof. We consider a scenario with two settings, both of which have n = 2 actions and m = 2
items, and which differ only in the probabilities of the items given the second action. Let τ be
some constant > 2 (to be fixed later), and let µ =
√
η
τ . Let β = (1 +
1
τ2
)−1 and note that β < 1.
Setting I:
r1 =
β
τ2µ
r2 =
β
τ2µ
a1 : τµ τµ c1 = 0
a2 : τ
2µ µ c2 =
τ−1
τ3
1
1−µβ
Setting II:
r1 =
β
τ2µ
r2 =
β
τ2µ
a1 : τµ τµ c1 = 0
a2 : µ τ
2µ c2 =
τ−1
τ3
1
1−µβ
Note further that the minimum probability of any set of items in both settings is q2,{1,2} =
τ2µ2 = η, as required by definition of η.
The expected reward achieved by the two actions in the two settings is R1 = 2β/τ < 1 and
R2 = (1 + 1/τ
2)β = 1. Moreover, the cost of action 2 is c2 ≤ β/τ2. So the welfare achieved by the
two actions is R1 − c1 < β and R2 − c2 ≥ β.
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In both settings the optimal IC contract incentivizes action 2, by paying only for the set of
items that maximizes the likelihood ratio. In Setting 1 this is {1}, in Setting 2 it is {2}. The
payment for this set in both cases is c2/(τ
2µ(1−µ)−τµ(1−τµ)) = c2/(τ2µ−τµ). This leads to an
expected payment of τ2µ(1−µ) · c2/(τ2µ− τµ) = β/τ2. The resulting payoff (and our benchmark)
is therefore R2 − β/τ2 = β.
We now argue that if we cannot distinguish between the two settings, then we can only achieve
a ≈ 1.1568 approximation. Of course, we can always pay nothing and incentivize action 1, but this
only yields a payoff of 2β/τ . We can also try to δ-incentivize action 2 in both settings, by paying for
outcome {1} and {2}. But (as we show below) the payoff that we can achieve this way is (for δ → 0
and µ→ 0) at most (1+1/τ2− (τ2+1)/((τ −1)τ3)β. Now max{2/τ, 1+1/τ2− (τ2+1)/((τ −1)τ3}
is minimized at τ = 1 +
√
2 where it is 2/(1 +
√
2) ≈ 0.8284. The upper bound on the payoff from
action 2 for this choice of τ is actually increasing in both µ and δ and ≈ 0.8644 · β at the upper
bounds µ0 =
√
η0/(2
2) = 1/100 and δ0 = 1/100, implying that the best we can achieve without
knowing the setting is a ≈ 1/0.8644 ≈ 1.1568 approximation.
So if we want to achieve at least a ≤ 1.15 approximation with probability at least 1−γ, then we
need to be able to distinguish between the two settings with at least this probability. A necessary
condition for being able to distinguish between the two settings is that we see at least some item
in one of our queries to action 2. So,
1− γ ≤ 1− (1− τ2µ)2s,
which implies that s ≥ log(γ)/(2 log(1− τ2µ) ≥ − log(γ)/(2 · µ · τ2) ≥ − log(γ)/(18µ). Plugging in
µ we get s ≥ − log(γ)/(18
√
µ
τ ) > − log(γ)/(9
√
µ).
We still need to prove our claims regarding the payoff that we can achieve if we want to δ-
incentivize action 2 in both settings. To this end consider the IC constraints for δ-incentivizing
action 2 over action 1 in Setting I and Setting II, respectively:
τ2µ(1− µ)p{1} + (1− τ2µ)µp{2} − c2 ≥
τµ(1− τµ)p{1} + (1− τµ)τµp{2} − δ, and
(1− τ2µ)µp{1} + τ2µ(1− µ)p{2} − c2 ≥
τµ(1− τµ)p{1} + (1− τµ)τµp{2} − δ.
Adding up these constraints yields
(τ2µ(1− µ) + (1− τ2µ)µ− 2τµ(1− τµ)) · (p{1} + p{2}) ≥ 2c2 − 2δ.
We maximize the minimum performance across the two settings by choosing p{1} = p{2}. Letting
p = p{1} = p{2} we thus obtain
(τ2µ(1− µ) + (1− τ2µ)µ− 2τµ(1− τµ))p ≥ c2 − δ.
It follows that
p ≥ c2 − δ
τ2µ+ µ− 2τµ .
The performance of the optimal contract that δ-incentivizes action 2 in both settings thus achieves
an expected payoff of
R2 − (τ2µ(1− µ) + (1− τ2µ)µ) c2 − δ
τ2µ+ µ− 2τµ = R2 −
τ2(1− 2µ) + 1
(τ − 1)2 (c2 − δ).
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Plugging in R2 and c2 and letting δ → 0 and µ→ 0 we obtain the aforementioned 1+1/τ2− (τ2+
1)/((τ−1)τ3)β. Finally, to see that the expected payoff evaluated at τ = 1+√2 > 2 is increasing in
both δ and µ observe that the derivative in δ is simply the probability term (τ2(1−2µ)+1)/(τ −1)2
which is positive and that both this probability term and the cost c2 are decreasing in µ implying
that as µ increases we subtract less.
6.2 Inverse polynomial probabilities
We show a positive result for the case where the minimum probability η is inverse polynomial.
Namely, letOPT denote the expected payoff of the optimal IC contract; then with poly(n,m, 1η ,
1
ǫ ,
1
γ )
queries it is possible to find with probability at least (1 − γ) a 4ǫ-IC contract with payoff at least
OPT − 5ǫ. Formally:
Theorem 6.2. Fix ǫ > 0, and assume ǫ ≤ 1/2. Fix distributions Q such that qi,S ≥ η for all i ∈ [n]
and S ⊆ M . Denote the expected payoff of the optimal IC contract for distributions Q by OPT .
Then there is an algorithm that with s = (3 log(2nηγ ))/(ηǫ
2) queries to each action and probability
at least 1− γ, computes a contract p˜ which (i) is 4ǫ-IC on the actual distributions Q; and (ii) has
expected payoff Π on the actual distributions satisfying Π ≥ OPT − 5ǫ.
To prove Theorem 6.2, we first prove a series of lemmas (Lemmas 6.1 to 6.5). Proofs appear in
Appendix G.
Lemma 6.1. Consider the algorithm that issues s queries to each action i ∈ N , and sets q˜i,S to be
the empirical probability of set S under action i. With s = (3 log(2nηγ ))/(ηǫ
2) queries to each action,
with probability at least 1− γ, for all i ∈ [n] and S ⊆M ,
(1− ǫ)qi,S ≤ q˜i,S ≤ (1 + ǫ)qi,S .
Lemma 6.2. Suppose that (1 − ǫ)qi,S ≤ q˜i,S ≤ (1 + ǫ)qi,S for all i ∈ [n] and S ⊆ M . Consider
contract p. If ai is the action that is incentivized by this contract under the actual probabilities Q,
then the payoff of ai under the empirical distributions Q˜ is at least as high as that of any other
action up to an additive term of 2ǫ.
Lemma 6.3. Suppose that (1 − ǫ)qi,S ≤ q˜i,S ≤ (1 + ǫ)qi,S for all i ∈ [n] and S ⊆ M . Consider
contract p˜. If ai is the action that is δ-incentivized by this contract under the empricial probabilities
Q˜, then the payoff of ai under the actual distributions is at least as high as that of any other action
up to an additive term of δ + 2ǫ.
Lemma 6.4. Suppose that (1 − ǫ)qi,S ≤ q˜i,S ≤ (1 + ǫ)qi,S for all i ∈ [n] and S ⊆ M . If action ai
achieves payoff Π˜ under contract p˜ when evaluated on the empirical distributions Q˜, then it achieves
payoff Π ≥ Π˜− 2ǫ when evaluated on the actual distributions Q.
Lemma 6.5. Assume ǫ ≤ 1/2. Suppose that (1 − ǫ)qi,S ≤ q˜i,S ≤ (1 + ǫ)qi,S for all i ∈ [n] and
S ⊆M . If action ai achieves payoff P under contract p when evaluated on the actual distributions
Q, then it achieves payoff P˜ ≥ P − 3ǫ when evaluated on the empirical distributions Q.
We are now ready to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Compute empirical probabilities Q˜ by querying each action s times. By
Lemma 6.1, with probability at least 1 − γ, the empirical probabilities obtained in this way will
satisfy (1− ǫ)qi,S ≤ q˜i,S ≤ (1 + ǫ)qi,S for all i ∈ [n] and S ⊆M .
26
Suppose we compute the optimal 2ǫ-IC contract p˜ on the empirical distributions Q˜. Denote the
expected payoff achieved by this contract on Q˜ by Π˜, and the expected payoff it achieves on Q by Π.
Likewise, consider the optimal IC contract p on the actual distributions Q. Denote the expected
payoff OPT achieved by this contract on the actual distributions Q by P , and the expected payoff
it achieves on Q˜ by P˜ .
Note that by Lemma 6.3, contract p˜ which is 2ǫ-IC on Q˜ is 4ǫ-IC on Q. Furthermore, by
Lemma 6.2, contract p which is IC on Q is 2ǫ-IC on Q˜. This implies that Π˜ ≥ P˜ . Together with
Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.5 we obtain
Π ≥ Π˜− 2ǫ ≥ P˜ − 2ǫ ≥ P − 5ǫ,
which proves the theorem.
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A Basic properties of IC and δ-IC contracts
In this appendix we state and prove several additional results concerning IC and δ-IC contracts.
A.1 Intractability of the ellipsoid method
We start by showing the intractability of the ellipsoid method for MIN-PAYMENT, except for the
special case of n = 2. Recall LP (1) for the MIN-PAYMENT problem. Its dual is as follows, where
{λi′} are n− 1 nonnegative variables (one for every action other than i):
max
∑
i′ 6=i
λi′(ci − ci′)
s.t.
(∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
)− 1 ≤∑
i′ 6=i
λi′
qi′,S
qi,S
∀S ⊆ E, qi,S > 0,
λi′ ≥ 0 ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n].
Consider applying the ellipsoid method to solve LP (1) for action ai. The separation oracle
problem is: Given an instantiation of the dual variables {λi′}, consider the combination distribution∑
i′ 6=i λi′qi′ , which is a convex combination of the product distributions {qi′}. To find a violated
constraint of the dual LP we need to find a set S for which the likelihood ratio between the
combination distribution and the product distribution qi is sufficiently small.
Note that a combination distribution is not itself a product distribution.16 Therefore solving the
separation oracle is not easy and in fact it is an NP-hard problem even for n = 3, as formalized in
Proposition A.1. In the special case of n = 2, the combination distribution is a product distribution.
By taking S to be all items that are more likely according to qi than according to the combination
distribution, we minimize the likelihood ratio and solve the separation oracle. (This is one way to
conclude that OPT-CONTRACT with n = 2 is tractable.)
Proposition A.1. Solving the separation oracle of dual LP (2) is NP-hard for n ≥ 3.
Proof. Rather than prove Proposition A.1 directly, it is enough to point the reader to Corollary B.1,
which establishes the NP-hardness of MIN-PAYMENT.
Remark A.1. Proposition A.1 immediately holds for δ-IC as well, i.e., for the separation oracle of
dual LP (4). This dual corresponds to primal LP (6) solving MIN-PAYMENT for δ-IC contracts.
This is simply because the separation oracle problem of dual LP (4) is identical to that of dual
LP (2).
16For example, consider a fifty-fifty mix between the following two product distributions over two items: a point
mass on the empty set, and a point mass on the grand bundle. This combination distribution has probability 1
2
for
the empty set and probability 1
2
for the grand bundle, and the item marginals are 1
2
. A product distribution with
item marginals of 1
2
has probability 1
4
for every set.
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A.2 Implementability and tractability of separable contracts
Next we state and prove two results concerning implementability and computability of δ-IC con-
tracts. Proposition A.2 characterizes δ-implementability and Proposition A.3 establishes tractabil-
ity of δ-IC separable contracts.
Proposition A.2. For every δ > 0, every action ai can be δ-implemented up to tie-breaking.
Proof. Action ai can be δ-implemented if and only if LP 15 has a feasible solution.
min 0 (15)
s.t. (1 + δ)
(∑
S⊆E qi,SpS
)
− ci ≥
∑
S⊆E qi′,SpS − ci′ ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n]
pS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ E.
Consider the dual:
max
∑
i′ 6=i λi′(ci − ci′) (16)
s.t. (1 + δ)qi,S
∑
i′ 6=i λi′ ≤
∑
i′ 6=i λi′qi′,S ∀S ⊆ E, qi,S > 0
λi′ ≥ 0 ∀i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ [n].
Since qi and {qi′} are distributions and δ > 0, the only feasible solution to the dual LP (16) is
λi′ = 0 for every i
′ 6= i. The dual is feasible and bounded, hence the primal must be feasible,
completing the proof.
Remark A.2. Proposition A.2 may seem surprising at first glance, but it is arguably less striking
in comparison to implementability by IC contracts. Consider the computational problem IMPLE-
MENTABLE: The input is a succinct principal-agent setting and an action ai, and the output is
whether ai is implementable by an IC contract. The contract theory literature has characterized im-
plementable actions as those whose distribution is not a convex combination of other distributions
with a lower combined cost (see,e.g., [23]). In general, for any set of product distributions corre-
sponding to actions ai′ 6= ai, only a trivial family of convex combinations preserve the product struc-
ture required in order to reconstruct the distribution of ai; thus the answer to IMPLEMENTABLE
is almost always YES.
Proposition A.3. Let δ ≥ 0. Given a principal-agent setting, an optimal linear (resp., separable)
δ-IC contract can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. The problem of finding an optimal linear (resp., separable) δ-IC contract for incentivizing
any action ai can be formulated as a polynomial-sized LP with 1 variable (resp., m variables)
representing the contract’s parameter α (resp., the item payments {pj}), and n−1 δ-IC constraints.
A.3 Connections between IC and δ-IC contracts
We conclude this appendix with two results on the connection between IC and δ-IC contracts. In
Proposition A.4 we show that from any contract that δ-incentivizes action ai, we can derive an
IC contract with approximately the same expected payoff for the principal, up to a multiplicative
factor of (1−√δ) and an additive loss of (√δ − δ). This is achieved by transferring to the agent a
small fraction of the principal’s expected payoff from the original δ-IC contract. Intuitively, such
a transfer makes the agent’s incentives “more aligned” with those of the principal, thus achieving
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incentive compatibility. In Proposition A.5 we show that the additive loss in Proposition A.4 is
necessary: there can be a constant-factor gap between what a δ-IC contract can achieve for the
principal and what the optimal IC contract can achieve, even as δ → 0. Together, Propositions A.4
and A.5 paint an interesting and complete picture in comparison to auctions, where the relation
between optimal ǫ-IC auctions and optimal IC auctions is an open question.
To state Proposition A.4, denote by ℓα=1 the linear contract with parameter α = 1 (that
transfers the full reward from principal to agent).
Proposition A.4. Fix a principal-agent setting and δ > 0. Let p be a contract that δ-incentivizes
action ai. Then the IC contract p
′ defined as (1−
√
δ)p+
√
δℓα=1 achieves for the principal expected
payoff of at least (1−
√
δ)(Ri − pi)− (
√
δ − δ), where Ri − pi is the expected payoff of contract p.
Proof. The expected payoff of action ai under the interpolation contract p
′ is
Ri − [(1 −
√
δ)pi +
√
δRi] = (1−
√
δ)(Ri − pi).
We will argue that for every action ai′ with i
′ 6= i, either i′ is not incentivized by p′ (Case 1) or its
expected payoff is sufficiently high (Case 2).
Case 1: Assume Ri− (1 +
√
δ)pi > Ri′ − pi′ . We claim that in this case ai is preferred over ai′
under contract p′. Namely,
(1−
√
δ)pi +
√
δRi − ci = (1 + δ)pi − ci +
√
δ(Ri − (1 +
√
δ)pi)
≥ pi′ − ci′ +
√
δ(Ri − (1 +
√
δ)pi)
> pi′ − ci′ +
√
δ(Ri′ − pi′)
= (1−
√
δ)pi′ +
√
δRi′ − ci′ ,
where we used that action ai is δ-incentivized under p for the first inequality, and the second
inequality holds by assumption because we are in Case 1.
Case 2: Assume now that Ri− (1+
√
δ)pi ≤ Ri′−pi′ . In this case the expected payoff achieved
by action ai′ is high. Namely,
Ri′ − (1−
√
δ)pi′ −
√
δRi′ = (1−
√
δ)(Ra′i − pa′i)
≥ (1−
√
δ)(Ri − (1 +
√
δ)pi)
= (1−
√
δ)(Ri − pi)− (1−
√
δ)
√
δpi,
where the inequality holds by assumption because we are in Case 2.
Proposition A.5. For any δ ∈ (0, 1/2], there exists a principal-agent setting where the optimal
contract extracts expected payoff OPT but a δ-IC contract extracts expected payoff ≥ 43OPT (and
OPT can be arbitrarily large).
Proof. Consider the following principal-agent setting parameterized by δ and ǫ > 0. Let M = ǫ/δ.
There are n = 2 actions and m = 2 items. The probabilities of the items given the actions is
described by the following matrix (
1
4
2ǫ
3(M+ǫ)
0 1
)
,
where the first column corresponds to item 1 and the second column to item 2. Set the rewards to
be r1 =
4ǫ
3 for item 1 and r2 =M + ǫ for item 2 (notice r1 < r2), and the costs to be c1 = 0 and
c2 =M− Mǫ2(M+ǫ) > 0. Observe that the expected rewards are R1 = ǫ and R2 =M+ ǫ.
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Claim A.1. OPT = ǫ.
Proof of Claim A.1. The expected payoff from letting the agent chose the zero-cost action a1 is
R1 = ǫ. Can we get any better by incentivizing a2? The optimal contract for incentivizing the
costly action in a 2-action setting is well-understood (see e.g. [23]): The only positive payment
should be for the single subset of items maximizing the likelihood that the agent has chosen action
a2; in our case this is the subset {2} containing item 2 only. Observe that its probability given
action 1 is ǫ2(M+ǫ) . The 2-action characterization also specifies the payment for this outcome,
setting it at p{2} = c2/
(
1− ǫ2(M+ǫ)
)
=M. Subtracted from R2 we get expected payoff of ǫ from
optimally incentivizing a2. △
Claim A.2. Contract p that paysM− ǫ3 for outcome S = {2} and 0 otherwise δ-incentivizes action
a2 with expected payoff R2 − p2 = 43ǫ.
Proof of Claim A.2. We show action a2 is δ-IC: The agent’s expected utility from a1 is
ǫ
2(M+ǫ)p2 =
ǫ(3M−ǫ)
6(M+ǫ) , and from a2 given contract (1+ δ)p it is (1+ δ)p2− c2 = (1+ ǫM)(M− ǫ3)−M+ Mǫ2(M+ǫ) =
ǫ(2M−ǫ)
3M +
Mǫ
2(M+ǫ) . It can be verified that the former is less than the latter for δ ≤ 12 . △
Putting these claims together completes the proof of Proposition A.5.
B Hardness with a constant number of actions
In this appendix we show NP-hardness of the two computational problems related to optimal
contracts when the number of actions n is constant. Appendices B.1 and B.2 prove hardness of
δ-OPT-CONTRACT (Proposition B.1), from which hardness of δ-MIN-PAYMENT follows by the
reduction in Section 2 (Corollary B.1).
Proposition B.1. δ-OPT-CONTRACT is NP-hard even for n = 3 actions.
Corollary B.1. δ-MIN-PAYMENT is NP-hard even for n = 3 actions.
B.1 The computational problem MIN-MAX-PROB
It will be convenient to reduce to δ-OPT-CONTRACT from a computational problem we call MIN-
MAX-PROB, which is a variant of MIN-MAX PRODUCT PARTITION [40] and thus NP-hard.
• Input: A product distribution q over m items such that for every item j, its probability qj is
equal to 1aj+1 where aj is an integer ∈ [3, amax] (log amax is polynomial in m).
• Output: YES iff there exists a subset of items S∗ such that qS∗ = ℓA, where A =
√∏
j aj and
ℓ =
∏
j qj.
We now take a closer look at MIN-MAX-PROB. Denote aS =
∏
j∈S aj.
Observation B.1. The probability of subset S is qS = ℓaS.
Proof. For every item j, the probability it is excluded is
1− qj = 1− 1
aj + 1
=
aj
aj + 1
= qjaj.
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So the probability of the outcome being precisely S is
qS =

∏
j∈S
qj



∏
j /∈S
(1− qj)


=

∏
j∈S
qj



∏
j /∈S
qjaj


=

 m∏
j=1
qj



∏
j /∈S
aj

 = ℓaS ,
as claimed.
Observation B.1 immediately implies:
Observation B.2. For every subset S, aS + aS = aS +
A2
aS
≥ 2A, where equality holds iff aS =
aS = A. Equivalently, qS + qS ≥ 2ℓA, where equality holds iff qS = qS = ℓA.
Proof. The inequality in the observation holds by the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means
(AM-GM inequality), which states that for any two non-negative numbers w, z, (w+ z)/2 ≥ √wz.
Namely, for z = aS , w = A
2/aS , and A =
√
zw the AM-GM inequality states that aS + A
2/aS =
z + w ≥ 2√wz = 2
√
aS ·A2/aS = 2A as claimed.
Observation B.2 shows the connection between MIN-MAX-PROB and the NP-hard problem
MIN-MAX PRODUCT PARTITION: q is a YES instance (there exists a subset of items S such
that qS = ℓA) iff aS = A.
The following observation will be useful in the reduction to δ-OPT-CONTRACT.
Observation B.3. Let ∆ = 1− ℓA2m−1, then 0 < ∆ < 1.
Proof. By definition,
ℓA =
√∏
aj∏
(aj + 1)
≤
∏√
aj + 1∏
(aj + 1)
=
1∏√
aj + 1
≤ 1
2m
<
1
2m−1
,
where the second-to-last inequality follows since aj ≥ 3 and so
√
aj + 1 ≥ 2. We conclude that
ℓA2m−1 < 1, completing the proof.
B.2 Proof of Proposition B.1
We now use hardness of MIN-MAX-PROB to establish hardness of δ-OPT-CONTRACT.
Proof of Proposition B.1. The proof is by reduction from MIN-MAX-PROB, as follows.
Reduction. Given an instance q of MIN-MAX-PROB, construct a principal-agent setting with
n = 3 actions.
• For action a1, set its product distribution q1 to be q.
• For action a2, set its product distribution q2 to be 1− q (i.e., q1,j + q2,j = 1 for every item j).
• For action a3, set its product distribution q3 to be such that q3,1 = 1 (i.e., this action’s outcome
always includes item 1), and q3,j =
1
2 for every other item j > 1.
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Set costs c1, c2 to zero and set c3 to be c = (amax + 1)
−1. The only nonzero reward is r = r1 for
item 1; set r to be any number strictly greater than ∆−1.
Analysis. First notice that the reduction is polynomial in m; in particular, the number of bits
of precision required to describe the probabilities, cost c and reward r is polynomial.
The analysis will show that the expected payoff the principal can extract by a δ-IC contract if
q is a YES instance is strictly larger than if q is a NO instance. We introduce some notation: Let
S1 = {S ⊆ [m] | 1 ∈ S}, i.e., S1 is the collection of all item subsets containing item 1. Given a
contract p, let P =
∑
S∈S1 pS (the total payment for subsets in S1). Observe that the expected
payment to the agent if he chooses action a3 is
P
2m−1 .
Claim B.1. Action a3 can be weakly δ-incentivized with expected payment
c
∆(1+δ) if and only if q
is a YES instance of MIN-MAX-PROB.
Proof of Claim B.1. Fix a δ-IC contract p that weakly δ-incentivizes action a3. By Observation B.1,
the agent’s expected utility from action a1 is ℓ
∑
S pSaS and from action a2 is ℓ
∑
S pSaS . The
agent’s expected utility from action a3 (after boosting by (1 + δ)) is
P (1+δ)
2m−1 − c.
Assume first that q is a NO instance. If p weakly incentivizes action a3 then
P (1 + δ)
2m−1
− c ≥ ℓ ·max
{∑
S
pSaS ,
∑
S
pSaS
}
≥ ℓ
2
(∑
S
pSaS +
∑
S
pSaS
)
=
ℓ
2
∑
S
pS(aS + aS) > ℓA
∑
S
pS ≥ ℓAP,
where the second-to-last inequality is by Observation B.2, and is strict by our assumption that q
is a NO instance. Rearranging P (1+δ)
2m−1
− c > ℓAP we get
c <
P (1 + δ)
2m−1
− ℓAP (1 + δ) = P (1 + δ)
2m−1
(
1− ℓA2m−1) = P∆(1 + δ)
2m−1
.
By Observation B.3 we can divide both sides by ∆(1+δ) > 0 to establish P
2m−1
> c∆(1+δ) , completing
the proof of the first direction.
Assume now that q is a YES instance. Then there exists S∗ such that aS∗ = aS∗ = A, and
without loss of generality S∗ ∈ S1 (otherwise take its complement). Consider the following contract:
Let pS∗ =
c2m−1
∆(1+δ) and set all other payments to 0. The expected payment to the agent for action
a3 is
pS∗
2m−1
= c∆(1+δ) as required, and the agent’s expected utility (after boosting by (1 + δ)) is
pS∗(1+δ)
2m−1
− c = c∆ − c = c(1−∆)∆ . Plugging in ∆ = 1 − ℓA2m−1, we get that the expected utility
from action a3 is ℓA
c2m−1
∆ = ℓApS∗. This is equal to the expected utility from action a1, since
ℓ
∑
S pSaS = ℓpS∗aS∗ = ℓApS∗ Similarly, the expected utility from action a2 is also ℓApS∗. We
conclude that p weakly δ-incentivizes a3, completing the proof of Claim B.1. △
We now use Claim B.1 to complete the hardness proof by showing that the expected payoff the
principal can extract if q is a YES instance is strictly larger than if q is a NO instance.
For a YES instance, by Claim B.1 action a3 can be weakly δ-incentivized with expected payment
c
∆(1+δ) . We argue that the values chosen in the reduction for c and r guarantee that action a3 has the
(strictly) highest expected payoff for the principal, so the agent breaks ties in favor of a3: Since the
only positive reward is r1 = r and since q3,1 = 1, the expected payoff from a3 is q3,1r1 − c∆(1+δ) =
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r − c∆(1+δ) . The expected reward (and thus also payoff) from a1 is at most q1,1r1 ≤ r4 (using
that a1 + 1 ≥ 4), and the expected reward from a2 is at most q2,1r1 ≤ (1 − 1amax+1)r. Since
r
4 ≤ (1− 1amax+1)r (using that amax ≥ 3), it suffices to show r− c∆(1+δ) ≥ r− c∆ > (1− 1amax+1)r, or
simplifying, r > c(amax+1)∆ . Since the reduction sets c = (amax + 1)
−1 and r > ∆−1, the argument
is complete.
For a NO instance, by Claim B.1 the expected payoff from a3 is strictly lower than r − c∆(1+δ) .
By the analysis of the YES case we know that the expected rewards from a1, a2 are strictly lower
than r − c∆ (and by limited liability the principal’s expected payoff is bounded by the expected
reward). This completes the proof of Proposition B.1.
C An FPTAS for the separation oracle
In this appendix we establish the separation oracle FPTAS stated in Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We adapt an FPTAS of Moran [41] (see also subsequent papers such as [43]).
Let
∆ = (1 + ǫ)1/2m.
FPTAS algorithm. The algorithm proceeds in iterations from 0 to m. In iteration j, the
partial solutions in that iteration are subsets of the first j items. For a partial solution S ⊆
{1, . . . , j}, recall that qℓ,S is the marginal probability to draw S among the first k items if the
sample is distributed according to qℓ.
The partial solutions in iteration j are partitioned into families Yj,1, . . . , Yj,rj . The partition
is such that for every family r ∈ [rj ] and partial solutions S, S′ ∈ Yj,r, for every distribution
ℓ ∈ [k] ∪ {i}, the ratio between qℓ,S and qℓ,S′ is at most ∆.
In the first iteration j = 0, the only solution is the empty set. The solutions in iteration j + 1
are generated from the families in iteration j as follows: One arbitrary partial solution S is chosen
from every family Yj,r to “represent” it, and for each such S two partial solutions S ∪ {j + 1} and
S are added to the solutions of iteration j + 1 (i.e., with and without the (j + 1)st item).
The algorithm outputs the minimum objective 1qi,S
∑
k αkqk,S among the solutions S in itera-
tion m.
Analysis. We first argue that ALG ≤ (1+ǫ)OPT s. Let S∗ be the optimal solution, and denote
the subset of S∗ containing only items among the first j by S∗j . By induction, in iteration j there
is a partial solution S′j such that ∆
−j · qℓ,S∗j ≤ qℓ,S′j ≤ ∆j · qℓ,S∗j for every distribution ℓ ∈ [k] ∪ {i}.
Denote S′ = S′m. Then ALG ≤ 1qi,S′
∑
k αkqk,S′ ≤ ∆2m · 1qi,S∗
∑
k αkqk,S∗ = (1 + ǫ)OPT
s.
It remains to show that the FPTAS runs in polynomial time. The running time is O(
∑
j rj).
In the input distributions {qk}, qi, denote the range of every nonzero probability by [qmin, 1] (qmin
can be exponentially small). For every distribution ℓ ∈ [k] ∪ {i}, the probabilities that are not 0
are at least qmmin. So a partition “in jumps of ∆” requires O(t) parts, where t is the smallest integer
satisfying qmmin ·∆t ≥ 1. So
t =
⌈
m log(q−1min)
log∆
⌉
=
⌈
2m2 log(q−1min)
log (1 + ǫ)
⌉
≤
⌈
2m2 log(q−1min)
ǫ
⌉
,
where the last inequality uses log(1 + ǫ) ≥ ǫ for ǫ ∈ (0, 1]. Since the partition to rj families
maintains “jumps of ∆” for n distributions, rk = O(t
n). We invoke the assumption that n is
constant to complete the analysis and the proof of Lemma 3.1.
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D Hardness of MIN-PAYMENT
In this appendix we show the following counterpart to Corollary 4.1.
Proposition D.1. For any constant c ∈ R, c ≥ 1, it is NP-hard to approximate the minimum
expected payment for implementing a given action to within a multiplicative factor c.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from MAX-3SAT. Given an instance of MAX-3SAT, the goal is
to determine whether the instance is satisfiable or whether at most 78 + ǫ of the clauses can be
satisfied, where ǫ is an arbitrarily small constant.
Reduction. Given ϕ, we obtain the SAT principal-agent setting corresponding to ϕ (Proposi-
tion 4.3), but we set the reward for every item to be 1 rather than 0. We add an action an+1 with
cost C and product distribution qn+1 with probability 12 for every item.
Analysis. As in the analysis in the proof of Proposition 4.4, if ϕ has a satisfying assignment
then we can implement an+1 at cost C. Otherwise recall that by Definition 4.4, the average action
over the first n actions leads to every item set S with probability at least 1−8ǫ2m . Consider a contract
p and let P =
∑
S pS . The expected utility of the agent for choosing an+1 is P/2
m − C. Consider
again the average action over the first n actions. The expected payment to the agent for “choosing”
this action (i.e., the expected payment over the average distribution) is at least 1−8ǫ2m P =
P
2m − 8ǫP2m ,
and there is some action ai (with cost 0) for which the expected payment is as high. To incentivize
an+1 over ai it must hold that
P
2m − C ≥ P2m − 8ǫP2m , i.e., P2m ≥ C8ǫ . We conclude that if there is no
assignment satisfying more than 78 + ǫ of the clauses, the expected payment for implementing an+1
is C8ǫ rather than C. Approximating the expected payment within a multiplicative factor 18ǫ would
thus solve the MAX-3SAT instance we started with, and we can make ǫ as small a constant as we
want.
E Proofs omitted from Section 4
In this appendix we provide proofs for Propositions 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
E.1 Existence of gap settings
We start by establishing the existence of gap settings for 2 actions (Proposition 4.1) and c actions
(Proposition 4.2).
Proof of Proposition 4.1. For the gap setting constructed above with c = 2 actions and γ = ǫ,
consider a δ-IC contract. Since the expected reward of the first action a1 is 1, and the maximum
expected welfare is 2− γ ≥ 2− 4ǫ1+2ǫ , if a contract is to extract more than 12−4ǫ/(1+2ǫ) = 12 + ǫ of the
expected welfare then it must δ-incentivize the last action ac (a limited liability contract cannot
extract more than the expected reward from an agent choosing a1, since a1 is zero-cost). Let p be
the payment for the item and let p0 be the payment for the empty set. For any action ai∗ that the
contract δ-incentivizes, the following inequality must hold for every i ∈ [c]:
(1 + δ)
(
γc−i
∗
p+ (1− γc−i∗)p0
)
− 1
γi∗−1
+ i∗ − (i∗ − 1)γ ≥
(
γc−ip+ (1− γc−i)p0
) − 1
γi−1
+ i− (i− 1)γ. (17)
Observe that for the contract to δ-incentivize ac at minimum expected payment, it must hold that
p0 = 0. We can now plug p0 = 0 into inequality (17) and choose i
∗ = c, i = i∗ − 1. We get a lower
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bound on the expected payment for δ-incentivizing ac:
p ≥ (1− γ)
2
γ(1 + δ − γ) .
The principal’s expected payoff is thus ≤ 1γ − (1−γ)
2
γ(1+δ−γ) ≤ 11+γ2−γ , where the last inequality uses
δ ≤ f(ǫ) = γ2. We get an upper bound of 1
1+γ2−γ on what the best δ-IC contract can extract out
of 2 − γ for the principal. The ratio is thus at most 12 + ǫ (using γ ≤ 14 ), and this completes the
proof of Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. For the gap setting constructed above with c actions and γ = ǫ, consider
a δ-IC contract. As in the proof of Proposition 4.1, this contract cannot extract more than 1c + ǫ
of the expected welfare by δ-incentivizing action a1. Assume from now on that the contract δ-
incentivizes action ai∗ for i
∗ ≥ 2 at minimum expected payment. As in the proof of Proposition
4.1, Inequality (17) must hold for i∗ and every i ∈ [c].
Assume first that the contract’s payment p0 for the empty set is zero. (This assumption is
without loss of generality for the case of c = 2 actions, as well as for c ≥ 3 and fully-IC optimal
contracts by Proposition 6 in [23].) Plugging p0 = 0 into Inequality (17) and choosing i = i
∗ − 1,
we get a lower bound on the expected payment for δ-incentivizing ai∗ (in particular making it
preferable to ai∗−1):
γc−i
∗
p ≥ (1− γ
i∗−1)(1− γ)
γi∗−1(1 + δ − γ) . (18)
The principal’s expected payoff is thus ≤ 1
γi∗−1
− (1−γi
∗
−1)(1−γ)
γi∗−1(1+δ−γ) ≤
γc+γi
∗
−1(1−γ)
γi∗−1(1+γc−γ) =
γc
γi∗−1(1+γc−γ) +
1−γ
1+γc−γ , where the last inequality uses δ ≤ f(ǫ) = γc. Maximizing this expression by plugging
in i∗ = c, we get an upper bound of 11+γc−γ on what the best δ-IC contract can extract out of
c− (c− 1)γ for the principal. The ratio can thus be shown to be at most 1c + ǫ, as required (using
that c ≥ 3 and γ ≤ 14 ; see Claim E.1).
Now consider the case that p0 > 0. We argue that in this case, plugging i = i
∗ − 1 into
Inequality (17) gives a lower-bound on γc−i∗p that is only higher than that in Inequality (18).
To see this, consider the contribution of p0 > 0 to the left-hand side of Inequality (17), which is
(1 + δ)(1 − γc−i∗)p0. Compare this to its contribution to the right-hand side of Inequality (17),
which is (1− γc−i)p0. For δ ≤ γc, γ ≤ 14 and i = i∗ − 1 it holds that (1 + δ)(1 − γc−i
∗
) ≤ 1− γc−i.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.2 up to Claim E.1.
Claim E.1. For every γ ∈ (0, 14 ] and c ∈ Z, c ≥ 3,
1
1 + γc − γ ·
1
c− (c− 1)γ ≤
1
c
+ γ.
Proof. We first establish the claim for c = 3. We need to show 11+γ3−γ · 13−2γ ≤ 13 + γ. Simplifying,
we need to show 13γ + 6γ4 ≤ 4 + 9γ2 + 7γ3, which holds for every γ ≤ 14 .
We now consider c ≥ 4: It is sufficient to show 11−γ · 1c−cγ ≤ 1c + γ. Multiplying by c we get
1
(1−γ)2 ≤ 1 + cγ. This holds if and only if c ≥ 2−γ(1−γ)2 . The right-hand side is an increasing function
in the range 0 < γ ≤ 14 and so we can plug in γ = 14 and verify. Since c ≥ 4 ≥ 289 , the proof is
complete.
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E.2 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Next we show that Algorithm 1 provides an efficient reduction from MAX-3SAT instances to gap
settings (Proposition 4.3).
Proof of Proposition 4.3. We first argue that there is a satisfying assignment to the MAX-3SAT
instance if and only if there is a set S with 0-probability in every one of the product distributions.
First note that there is a natural 1-to-1 correspondence between subsets {S} of items and truth
assignments to the variables: for every variable j, if item j ∈ S then assign TRUE and otherwise
FALSE. Now consider a set S and its corresponding assignment. S has 0-probability in the ith
product distribution iff either an item in S has probability 0 or an item in S has probability 1
according to this distribution. Therefore, in clause i, either one of the TRUE variables appears as a
positive literal or one of the FALSE variables appears as a negative literal. And this is a necessary
and sufficient condition for the clause to be satisfied. We conclude that S has 0-probability in every
product distribution if and only if the corresponding assignment satisfies every clause, establishing
condition (1) of Definition 4.4. To show condition (2), assume that at most 78 +α of the clauses can
be satisfied. Consider the average action whose distribution results from averaging over all actions.
This distribution has for every S a probability at least (18 − α) · 82m = 1−8α2m , since the probability
of S is 82m in every distribution corresponding to a clause which the assignment corresponding to
S does not satisfy. This completes the proof.
F Approximation by separable contracts
In this appendix we examine the gap between separable and optimal contracts.
Recall that a contract p is separable if there are payments p1, ..., pm such that p(S) =
∑
j∈S pj
for every S ⊆M . By linearity of expectation, the expected payment for action ai given a separable
contract p is
∑
j qi,jpj.
As we have shown in Proposition A.3 the optimal separable contract can be computed in polyno-
mial time via linear programming. Thus we know that separable (and other simple computationally-
tractable) contracts cannot achieve a constant approximation to OPT unless P = NP (Corol-
lary 4.1).
In fact, an even stronger lower bound holds—they cannot achieve an approximation better than
n, unless we relax the IC requirement to δ-IC. We provide a proof of this general lower bound for
the case of n = 2.
Proposition F.1. For every ǫ > 0 there is a principal-agent instance with n = 2 actions and
m = 2 items, in which the best separable contract only provides a 2− ǫ approximation to OPT .
Proof. For δ ∈ (0, 1) consider the following n = 2 actions and m = 2 items instance. The probabil-
ities qi,j for the two actions i ∈ {1, 2} and items j ∈ {1, 2} are
q1,1 =
δ
2
, q1,2 = 1− δ
2
and q2,1 =
1
2
, q2,2 =
1
2
.
The rewards rj for the two items j ∈ {1, 2} are
r1 =
1− (1− δ2)δ
δ
2
and r2 = δ.
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The resulting expected rewards Ri for the two actions i ∈ {1, 2} are
R1 = q1,1r1 + q1,2r2 =
δ
2
1− (1− δ2)δ
δ
2
+ (1− δ
2
)δ = 1, and
R2 = q2,1r1 + q2,2r2 =
1
2
1− (1− δ2)δ
δ
2
+
1
2
δ =
1
δ
− 1 + δ,
so that R2 > 1 for all δ ∈ (0, 1) and R2 →∞ as δ → 0. The costs ci for the two actions i ∈ {1, 2}
are
c1 = 0 and c2 = (1− δ)(R2 −R1) = (1− δ)(1
δ
− 2 + δ).
Note that on this instance
R1 − c1 = 1 and R2 − c2 = 2− 2δ + δ2.
We claim that: (1) The optimal contract can incentivize action 2 with an expected payment
of c2/(1 − δ2), so that the expected payoff to the principal is R2 − c2/(1 − δ2) = (1/δ − 1 + δ) −
(1/δ − 2+ δ)/(1 + δ). (2) The optimal separable contract can either incentivize action 1 by paying
nothing or it can incentivize action 2 by setting p1 = 2c2/(1− δ) and p2 = 0. Since
R2 − q2,1p1 = (1
δ
− 1 + δ)− 1
2
2c2
(1− δ) = 1
the expected payoff to the principal in both cases is 1.
Using (1) and (2) and setting δ = 12(3− ǫ−
√
ǫ2 − 10ǫ+ 9) we have
OPT
ALG
= (
1
δ
− 1 + δ)−
1
δ − 2 + δ
1 + δ
= 2− ǫ.
It remains to show (1) and (2). For (1) denote the payments in the optimal contract for outcomes
(1,0), (0,1), and (1,1) by p1, p2, p1,2. The optimal contract can incentivize action 2 via p1 > 0 and
p2 = p1,2 = 0 as long as
q2,1(1− q2,2)p1 − c2 ≥ q1,1(1− q1,2)p1
⇔ p1 ≥ c2
q2,1(1− q2,2)− q1,1(1− q1,2) =
4c2
1− δ2
Setting p1 = 4c2/(1− δ2) leads to an expected payment of q2,1(1− q2,2)p1 = c2/(1− δ2).
For (2) denote the payments of the optimal separable contract by p1 and p2 and note that the
optimal separable contract either has p1 > 0 and p2 = 0 or it has p1 = 0 and p2 > 0. In the former
case the incentive constraint is
q2,1p1 − c2 ≥ q1,1p1
and in the latter it is
q2,2p2 − c2 ≥ q1,2p2.
Note that since q1,2 = 1−δ/2 > 1/2 = q1,2 it is impossible to incentivize action 2 by having only
p2 > 0. In the other case, where only p1 > 0, the smallest p1 that satisfies the incentive constraint
is p1 = c2/(q2,1 − q1,1) = 2c2/(1 − δ).
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G Proofs of auxiliary lemmas in Section 6
In this appendix we provide proofs for Lemma 6.1, Lemma 6.2, Lemma 6.3, and Lemma 6.5.
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Note that with s = (3 log(2nηγ ))/(ηǫ
2) we have γ = nη ·2 exp(−ηsǫ2/3). Further
note that since qi,S ≥ η for all i ∈ [n] and S ⊆ M each action can assign positive probability to
at most 1/η sets S. Finally, for all i ∈ [n], S ⊆ M such that qi,S = 0 we have q˜i,S = 0. So, by
the union bound, it suffices to show that for each of the at most n/η pairs i, S with qi,S > 0 the
probability with which q˜i,S does not fall into [(1 − ǫ)qi,S, (1 + ǫ)qi,S] is at most 2 exp(−ηsǫ2/3).
Consider any such pair i, S. Let Xi,S denote the random variable that counts the number of
times set S was returned in the s queries to action i. Then q˜i,S = Xi,S/s and E[X] = sqi,S. So,
using Chernoff’s bound,
Pr[q˜i,S 6∈ [(1 − ǫ)qi,S, (1 + ǫ)qi,S]] = Pr[|Xi,S − E[Xi,S ]| ≥ ǫ]
≤ 2 exp(−ηsǫ2/3),
as claimed.
Proof of Lemma 6.2. Let ai be the action that is incentivized by p under the actual probabilities
Q, and let ai′ be any other action. Then,∑
S⊆M
q˜i,Spi,S − ci + 2ǫ ≥ (1− ǫ)
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S − ci + 2ǫ
≥
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S − ci + ǫ
≥
∑
S⊆M
qi′,Spi′,S − ci′ + ǫ
≥ (1 + ǫ)
∑
S⊆M
qi′,Spi′,S − ci′
≥
∑
S⊆M
q˜i′,Spi′,S − ci′ ,
where we used the bounds on the probabilities in the first and last step, that we are considering
normalized settings in the second and fourth step, and the IC constraint in the third step.
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Let ai be the action that is incentivized by p˜ under the empirical probabilities
Q˜, and let ai′ be any other action. Then,∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S − ci + δ + 2ǫ ≥ (1 + ǫ)
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S − ci + δ + ǫ
≥
∑
S⊆M
q˜i,Spi,S − ci + δ + ǫ
≥
∑
S⊆M
q˜i′,Spi′,S − ci′ + ǫ
≥ (1− ǫ)
∑
S⊆M
qi′,Spi′,S − ci′ + ǫ
≥
∑
S⊆M
qi′,Spi′,S − ci′ ,
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where we used that we are considering normalized settings in the first and the last step, the bounds
on the probabilities in the second and fourth step, and the δ-IC constraint in the third step.
Proof of Lemma 6.4. We have,
Π˜ =
∑
S⊆M
q˜i,SrS −
∑
S⊆M
q˜i,Spi,S
≤ (1 + ǫ)
∑
S⊆M
qi,SrS − (1− ǫ)
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S
≤
∑
S⊆M
qi,SrS −
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S + 2ǫ
= Π+ 2ǫ,
where we used the bounds on the payments in the first step and that we are considering normalized
settings in the second.
Proof of Lemma 6.5. We have,
P =
∑
S⊆M
qi,SrS −
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S
≤ 1
1− ǫ
∑
S⊆M
q˜i,SrS − 1
1 + ǫ
∑
S⊆M
q˜i,Spi,S
≤ (1 + 2ǫ)
∑
S⊆M
q˜i,SrS − (1− ǫ)
∑
S⊆M
qi,Spi,S
= Π+ 3ǫ,
where we used the bounds on the probability in the first step, and 1/(1 − ǫ) ≤ 1 + 2ǫ as well as
1/(1 + ǫ) ≥ 1− ǫ for all ǫ ≤ 1/2.
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